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1.1  Conceptual approach   
This PhD thesis focuses on the relevance and the use of dirty surplus accounting flows. 
Dirty surplus accounting flows bypass the income statement and are written-off directly 
from shareholders’ equity. The term ‘dirty surplus flows’ is used here in the context of 
‘clean surplus income’, which is defined as the periodic change in a firm’s shareholders’ 
equity  except  for  the  change  that  arises  from  transactions  between  the  firm  and  its 
owners.  
 
Thus, clean surplus income of a firm 
= Shareholders’ equity (t) – Shareholders’ equity (t-1) – Net Capital Inflow from Firm 
Owners (t) + Dividends (t)  
 
This  equation  represents  the  clean  surplus  relation  and  the  clean  surplus  income  is 
commonly referred to as comprehensive income in the US studies
1. Currently reported 
income is not necessarily equal to the clean surplus income, because firms can book 
some accounting flows directly to equity and keep them out of the income statement. As 
the existence of these flows is inconsistent with the clean surplus relation, they are called 
as dirty surplus accounting flows.  
 
As a consequence, dirty surplus flows of a firm 
                                                            
1 Many US studies, e.g. Linsmeier et al. (1997), use the term ‘comprehensive income’. We use 
‘clean surplus income’ throughout this thesis because this income measure is defined on the basis of 
clean surplus relation.    2 
= Shareholders’ equity (t) – Shareholders’ equity (t-1) – Net Capital Inflow from Firm 
Owners (t) + Dividends (t) – Reported Income (t) 
 
And clean surplus income of a firm 
= Reported Income + Dirty Surplus Flows 
 
Clean surplus income of a firm is the summary performance measure under the clean 
surplus relation and hence effectively is a measure that could compete with reported 
income of the firm for both equity valuation and contracting purposes (Linsmeier et al. 
1997). 
  
Two opposing views on dirty surplus accounting flows exist. From an informational 
perspective, dirty surplus flows are considered to be ‘transitory’, and hence are not able 
to convey information to stock market. Therefore, it is unnecessary to include them as 
part of bottom line earnings (Black 1993, Stark 1997, and Ohlson 1999). A valuation 
perspective, however, requires the articulation of balance sheet and income statement 
(Ohlson 1995, Ohlson 2003, Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 2003, and Christensen and 
Demski 2003). Hence, the income of a firm should be a comprehensive record of firm 
value changes and be prepared on the basis of clean surplus relation.  
 
This thesis intends to contribute to the study of these opposing views. 
 
1.2  Regulatory approach 
The thesis also intends to add empirical evidence to a recently heavily debated regulatory 
issue, the necessity of promoting a clean surplus income statement.  
   3 
Starting from 1997, IAS 1 (IASC 1997) requires a statement of changes in equity and the 
IASB also starts to consider the possibility of promoting a clean surplus statement in 
2001
2.  However,  there  are  still  doubts  about  the  relevance  of  clean  surplus  type  of 
statements and about the steps taken by EU to promote a ‘cleaner’ income statement via 
a full adaptation of international accounting standards (Zeff et al. 1999, and Alexander 
and Archer 2001). It would be desirable to exclude potential one-time items outside 
income statement to be consistent with the ‘true and fair view’ principle. However, such 
exclusion grants manager greater discretions.  
 
The studies on the relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows could potentially create a 
better understanding of stock investor’s use of financial information, and evaluate the 
appropriateness of reporting dirty surplus flows.  
 
1.3  The relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows 
I  provide  empirical  evidence  on  the  magnitude,  and  the  relevance  of  dirty  surplus 
accounting flows in European member states. In particular, I examine three research 
questions. First, do investors value dirty surplus flows? Second, are dirty surplus flows 
persistent? Third, is accounting conservatism forged through dirty surplus flows?  
 
In later chapters, I discuss earlier research on the relevance of aggregated dirty surplus 
flows.  Here,  I  focus  on  the  existing  research  about  the  relevance  of  three  major 
components of dirty surplus flows.  
 
Existing literature provides evidence on the relevance of three major components of 
dirty surplus accounting flows: foreign currency translation differences, goodwill write-
                                                            
2 In the U.S., for example, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued ‘Statement of Financial   4 
offs, and asset revaluations. Other dirty surplus items are often not very significant in 
magnitude. In order to illustrate the issues related to the value-relevance of dirty surplus 
accounting flows, hence I focus my discussions on the first three categories of dirty 
surplus accounting flows. 
 
1.3.1  The relevance of foreign currency translation differences 
Foreign currency translation differences record the gains and losses resulting from the 
consolidation of foreign subsidiary’s currencies in case of exchange rate fluctuation. Soo 
and Soo (1994) suggest that the stock returns are not associated with foreign currency 
translation  differences.  However,  both  Collins and  Salatka  (1993),  and  Bartov  (1997) 
document that the inclusion of foreign currency translation differences in earnings would 
potentially decrease earnings quality, as they are often considered as noise in reported 
earnings. Furthermore, Louis (2003) argues that the accounting treatments of foreign 
currency translation differences should take into account the economic consequences of 
exchange rate fluctuations on firm performances. He shows, for example, that there is an 
inverse relation between the translation adjustments and firm value in manufacturing 
sector  given  the  long-term  effects  of  exchange  rate  changes.  Hence,  results  are 
inconclusive and limited to the US. 
 
1.3.2  The relevance of goodwill write-offs  
Goodwill arises when premiums are paid to the  acquired firms. Historically, there is 
always  a  discussion  on  the  appropriateness  of  including  goodwill write-offs  in  firm’s 
performance report. Moehrle et al. (2001), for example, suggest that goodwill write-offs 
are  not  associated  with  firm  performance.  Their  findings  are  important  for  ‘new 
economics’ firms especially because the value of the intangible asset is an important 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Accounting Standards No.130: Reporting Comprehensive Income’ in 1997.    5 
indicator of operating performance. However, there are few studies on the relevance of 
goodwill write-offs in Europe.   
  
1.3.3  The relevance of asset revaluations 
Asset revaluations reflect upward or downward value changes of asset. Theoretically, the 
revalued  amount  may  not  be  a  reliable  estimate  due  to  the  potential  management 
discretion involved. Easton et al. (1993) provide evidence that revaluation reserves are 
related to price-to-book ratios, and hence firm performance. Barth and Clinch (1998), 
however,  find  little  evidence  indicating  that  independent  appraiser-based  revaluation 
amounts are more relevant to firm performance than director-based estimates. And, they 
do  suggest  that  the  revaluation  is  significantly  associated  with  share  prices  and  the 
present value of analyst forecasts of future earnings. Aboody et al. (1999) also find that 
revaluations are related to future operating performance and are associated with firm’s 
market  value.  Other  studies,  e.g.  O’Hanlon  and  Pope  (1999),  however,  find  little 
evidence on the relevance of asset revaluations using data from the UK. It seems difficult 
to draw similar conclusions in other European countries based on their findings. 
 
1.4  Conclusions 
As I will also show in later chapters that findings about the relevance of aggregated dirty 
surplus flows are also inconclusive. Hence, empirical studies on the relevance of dirty 
surplus  accounting  flows  in  Europe  are  needed  both  because  earlier  research  is 
inconclusive and research results in Europe are lacking. 
 
This thesis evaluates the features of dirty surplus accounting flows, and clean surplus 
income, in terms of their relevance to stock returns, their persistence, and their use in 
forging accounting conservatism.    6 
 
The evidence presented in Chapter 2 and chapter 3 shows that dirty surplus flows are 
transitory in most EU countries. Chapter 4 suggests that dirty surplus flows are used to 
forge news related conservatism, however, the tendency of reporting lower dirty surplus 
flows depends largely on accounting standards, instead of news. 
 
These findings are meant to assist standard setters and practitioners for their standards 
setting and decision-making purposes. 
 
This thesis takes an equity investor’s perspective. Obviously, standards setters need to 
balance the interests of all parties in order to develop a new standard because various 
contracting parties may have divergent demands. Also one needs to take into account the 
availability  of  other  accounting  information  for  a  full  understanding  of  the  use  of 
accounting information in firm valuation.  
 
1.5  Outline of the thesis 
Three empirical studies are included in the following three chapters. First, chapter 2 
discusses the value-relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows in the Netherlands. Using 
both incremental and relative value-relevance method, this study provides evidence on 
the association between stock market returns and clean surplus accounting information. 
The association between clean surplus accounting information, stock returns, and future 
firm operating performance in European countries are explored in chapter 3. Chapter 4 
investigates the use of dirty surplus flows in forging accounting conservatism. Finally, 
chapter 5 concludes.     
   7 
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Chapter 2
3 
The Value-Relevance of Dirty Surplus Accounting Flows in the Netherlands
4 
 
2.1   Introduction  
The relevance of accounting information, most notably earnings, is an important topic 
because of the potential use of accounting information for contracting and valuation 
purposes (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, and Beaver 1998). Recently, financial reporting 
standard setting bodies have come under attack for allowing potentially relevant dirty 
surplus flows
5 to be kept out of earnings. Dirty surplus accounting flows, e.g. goodwill 
write-offs, asset revaluations, etc., bypass bottom-line earnings and are taken directly to 
shareholders’ equity. 
 
Two  conflicting  views  exist  about  ‘dirty  surplus  accounting  flows’.  The  exclusion  of 
irrelevant dirty surplus flows from earnings could potentially enhance the quality of 
reported  earnings.  Reported  earnings  are  formed  on  the  basis  of  more  persistent 
components if noisy flows would be taken directly to shareholders’ equity. Dirty surplus 
flows are used, in this case, as the means of improving reporting efficiency, or more 
specifically earnings quality.  
 
On the other hand, the exclusion of relevant dirty surplus flows could decrease the 
informativeness  of  accounting  earnings
6.  For  instance,  the  fact  that  value  relevant 
                                                            
3 This chapter is based on Wang et al. (2006) forthcoming in the International Journal of Accounting. 
4 This chapter benefits from discussions at the 2002 EAA Annual Congress in Copenhagen, and the 2004 
KPMG EAA Doctoral Colloquium in Prague. The authors wish to thank seminar participants at Tilburg 
University, especially Laurence van Lent, Patrick McColgan, Valeri Nikolaev, Jeroen Suijs, the editor, and 
the referees of the International Journal of Accounting for their constructive comments.      
5 Dirty surplus accounting flows bypass income statement and are written-off directly from shareholders’ 
equity. The term ‘dirty surplus flows’ is used here in the context of ‘clean surplus earnings’, which is 
defined as all changes of shareholders’ equity except for the transactions between firms and their owners.     
6 There are also other explanations for the existence of dirty surplus flows. For instance, current treatment 
of asset revaluations is thought to be consistent with the conservatism principle. Upward asset revaluations   9 
information is not disclosed in firms’ primary statements may hinder the investors’ ability 
to extract it in a timely and precise manner (O’Hanlon and Pope 1999). Then it is likely 
that reported earnings are not a good indicator of stock returns. 
 
In more and more countries standard setters apparently accept the second view, and they 
are eliminating dirty surplus accounting options to reduce managers’ discretions with 
regard  to  reported  bottom-line  earnings.  For  example,  in  the  UK,  the  Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) effectively abolished extraordinary items in 1992 (FRS 3) and 
eliminated the dirty surplus treatment of goodwill write-offs in 1998 (FRS 10). In the 
Netherlands, the Council for Annual Reporting abolished the dirty surplus treatment of 
goodwill write-offs in 2000 (RJ 500.218).  
 
The value-relevance of dirty surplus items is an empirical issue. And also, given the costs 
of new regulations and the costs of enforcement, the issue arises over whether or not 
they deserve the recent special attention of standard setting bodies.  
 
The accounting research by Feltham and Ohlson (1995), and Ohlson (1995) can also 
motivate the attention directed at clean surplus accounting. In their residual income-
based  valuation  framework,  firm  value  is  directly  linked  to  observable  accounting 
numbers given that the financial statements articulate under the clean surplus relation
7. It 
implies that clean surplus income is considered as the summary performance measure in 
firm valuation. (Bernard 1995, Walker 1997, and Dechow et al. 1999). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
are recorded as revaluation reserves, while downward revaluations in excess of revaluation reserves are 
expensed immediately on the income statement (Basu 1997).  
7 Clean surplus relation requires that ending-period book value of shareholders’ equity is equal to the sum 
of opening-period book value of shareholders’ equity, clean surplus income, and net capital inflows after 
subtracting dividend payments.    10 
This  study  looks  at  firms  listed  in  the  Netherlands  from  1988  to  1997.  During  that 
period, quite a few dirty surplus flows were allowed there. Since their existence was 
relatively unhindered, the Netherlands seems to be an interesting setting to investigate 
the relevance of dirty surplus items.   
 
Moreover, although accounting practice in the Netherlands is considered to be similar to 
that in the common law countries, such as the UK, and the US (Van Lent 1997), Dutch 
investors are not thought to be very influential in company decision-making processes 
due to the Dutch policy of self-regulation in the private sector for financial reporting 
(DeJong et al. 2004) and the relatively weak position of its private sector regulatory body: 
Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving (RJ). In the majority of Dutch listed firms, investors have 
little direct influence on the composition of the management and the supervisory board 
with their two-tier co-optation system because new board members are ‘self-elected’ by 
the remaining members in that board
8.  
 
The freedom to choose financial reporting methods that the Dutch managers enjoy and 
the characteristics of the governance structure (Kabir et al. 1997, and van Ees et al. 
2003)
9, therefore, could provide room for the existence of value-relevant dirty surplus 
items being kept out of firms’ primary performance report, i.e. an income statement.  
 
                                                            
8  In  a  two-tier  system,  firms  are  governed  by  a  management  board  and  a  supervisory  board.  In  the 
Netherlands, when firms have more than 100 employees and a common equity in excess of 13 million 
euros, they are classified as structure firms. The supervisory boards of structure firms could appoint and 
dismiss management boards and individual members of the supervisory boards, and the boards also have 
decision rights over financial statements (van Ees et al. 2003).      
9  Cuijpers  et  al.  (2004)  suggest  that  the  co-optation  system  enhances  efficient  corporate  governance 
practices  and  they  assume  that  the  supervisory  boards  are  able  to  monitor  firms  (also  their  financial 
reports) efficiently. However, we choose to follow the arguments in Kabir et al. (1997), and Van Ees et al. 
(2003), which consider this co-optation system as an anti-takeover mechanism and it is in favor of the 
supervisory board. We suggest that this system results in inefficiencies of the supervisory boards.   11 
This  chapter  investigates  whether  dirty  surplus  items  are  value-relevant  and  whether 
clean surplus net income is more highly associated with stock returns than currently 
reported income. To the best of our knowledge, no other study on the value-relevance of 
dirty surplus accounting flows has been done in the Netherlands.   
 
To  test  the  value-relevance  of  dirty  surplus  flows  empirically,  we  use  the  standard 
approach of examining the statistical association between dirty surplus flows and stock 
returns. We employ an incremental association method to test the informativeness of 
dirty surplus accounting flows. In addition, we also conduct a relative association study 
to compare the explanatory power (i.e. with respect to returns) of clean surplus income 
and reported income (under the Dutch GAAP).   
 
Due to a potential mismatch of stock market and accounting information, it is suggested 
in the literature to extend the testing window over long periods (Easton et al. 1992, 
Warfield and Wild 1992, and O’Hanlon and Pope 1999). Hence, we accumulate both 
stock market and accounting information in order to increase the power of the test.  
 
Consistent with previous studies, we find that both currently reported income and clean 
surplus income are always relevant in explaining stock returns. But, reported income 
appears to be a better indicator of stock returns than clean surplus income.  
 
The results also suggest that the aggregated dirty surplus flows are not relevant even with 
accumulation intervals of up to 10 years. However, there is some evidence that both the 
asset revaluations and the currency translation differences are incrementally informative. 
Our data also indicate that goodwill write-offs are not relevant and the quality of earnings   12 
wouldn’t  have  been  enhanced  in  the  testing  period  if  the  dirty  surplus  treatment  of 
goodwill write-offs were abolished at that time.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss 
dirty surplus accounting and provide some empirical evidence on the value-relevance of 
dirty surplus flows. The third section discusses dirty surplus accounting possibilities in 
the  Netherlands.  The  fourth  section  describes  the  hypothesis  development  and  the 
research design. The data analysis and the empirical results are presented in the fifth 
section. In the final section, we conclude the chapter and provide suggestions for future 
research.    
  
2.2   Literature review 
2.2.1   Dirty surplus accounting 
Financial  statements  are  stated  on  a  clean  surplus  basis  if  ending-period  book  value 
( t BV )  equals  the  sum  of  opening-period  book  value  ( 1 − t BV ),  clean  surplus  earnings 
( t NICL ),  and  net  capital  inflows  ( t NetCap )  after  subtracting  dividend  payments 
( t DIV ): t t t t t DIV NetCap NICL BV BV − + + = −1 .  Dirty  surplus  flows  arise  if  certain 
changes in shareholders’ equity bypass reported earnings. 
 
As explained earlier, stock investors could have difficulties in extracting value relevant 
information from dirty surplus flows to a certain extent, due to the fact that they are 
disclosed in secondary statements only (Brief and Peasnell 1996, and O’Hanlon and Pope 
1999).   
   13 
From the equity valuation perspective used in this chapter, we consider a component of 
dirty  surplus  accounting  flows  to  be  relevant  for  stock  returns  if  it  is  incrementally 
relevant
10. Moreover, reported earnings would be less relevant if relative transitory flows 
were included (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Beaver 1998, and Scott 2003). So if dirty 
surplus flows were less persistent than other components of reported earnings, then the 
clean surplus earnings would not be more relevant than the reported earnings even if 
dirty surplus accounting flows are incrementally informative.  
 
A value-relevance study of accounting information presumes that the market is efficient 
on average, i.e. all publicly available information is reflected in prices. Sloan (1996) and 
Xie (2001), for example, provide consistent evidence that the US market does not price 
components of earnings correctly. Unfortunately, there is little evidence on the efficiency 
of the Dutch market. Aboody et al. (2002), however, suggest that although the relevance 
of  accounting  numbers  would  be  considerably  lowered  if  it  were  measured  in  an 
inefficient market, this difference is not big enough to alter the conclusions that previous 
value-relevance studies draw. Also it seems that the market under-reacts to accounting 
information only up to three years. Therefore, we deal with the issue of potential market 
inefficiency by accumulating both stock market and accounting information over periods 
up to 10 years.  
 
2.2.2   Evidence on the magnitude and value-relevance of dirty surplus flows 
There is earlier evidence on the magnitude of dirty surplus accounting flows. The median 
of dirty surplus flows (deflated by market value of shareholders’ equity) is -0.4% in the 
UK (O’Hanlon and Pope 1999) and 0% in the US (Dhaliwal et al. 1999) in the periods 
                                                            
10 Note that, the reporting of dirty surplus flows could also serve compensation purposes and be relevant 
there; see for example Biddle and Choi (2003). However, we do not address this issue in this chapter.      
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studied.  Lo  and  Lys  (2000)  document  a  considerable  deviation  of  clean  surplus 
accounting  for  the  US  firms
11.  In  particular,  14%  of  their  observations  report  dirty 
surplus flows that are larger than 10% of the clean surplus income. Similar results can be 
found in Cahan et al. (2000) with New Zealand data, Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) for 
Canadian firms, or Lo and Lys (2000), Hand and Landsman (2005), and Chambers et al. 
(2005) all with US data. 
 
However, US research suggests that clean surplus income does not perform better than 
reported income when associating both with stock returns (Dhaliwal et al. 1999). More 
recent studies, however, do claim that the clean surplus income as defined in SFAS 130 is 
a better measure of firm value (Biddle and Choi 2003, and Chambers et al. 2005).  
 
Studies in other countries find little evidence that dirty surplus flows are relevant; see for 
example: O'Hanlon and Pope (1999) for the UK, Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) for Canada, 
and Cahan et al. (2000) for New Zealand. It seems that there is no conclusive evidence 
on the value-relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows.                      
                                                                   
2.3   Dirty surplus accounting practices in the Netherlands 
2.3.1   Accounting regulatory procedures 
During  the  period  covered  in  this  chapter  (1988-1997),  the  following  describes  the 
financial reporting regulation in the Netherlands (Buijink and Eken 1999, and Zeff et al. 
1999). 
 
The  Fourth  (1978)  and  the  Seventh  (1983)  EU  Directives  were  incorporated  in  the 
Dutch  domestic  company  law.  The  Fourth  Directive  regulates  the  format  and  the 
                                                            
11 Using data from 1962-1997.   15 
content of financial reporting by companies with limited liability, and in particular the 
overriding  ‘true  and  fair  view’  principle  is  adopted.  The  seventh  Directive  stipulates 
regulations about consolidated financial statements.  
 
Fundamental issues in Dutch annual reporting appear in the company law as part of the 
Dutch Civil Code. The parliament is the primary source of financial reporting regulation. 
The  regulations  are  initiated  by  the  Minister  of  Justice  (Minister  van  Justitie)  and 
evaluated  by  the  Social  and  Economic  Council  (Sociaal-Economische  Raad),  i.e.  the 
advisory body of parliament in economic matters, and by the Council of State (Raad van 
State), i.e. the senior advisory body of government in legal matters.  
 
The  Enterprise  Chamber  (Ondernemingskamer)  has  the  legal  authority  to  evaluate 
complaints  from  interested  parties  if  they  consider  corporate  financial  statements 
contradict the law.  
 
The Dutch auditing profession and representatives from companies participate in the 
council for annual reporting (Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving, or RJ). As a private sector 
regulatory  body,  the  RJ  issues  guidelines  that  elaborate  on  legal  stipulations.  The 
Netherlands Institute of Registered Accountants (NIvRA) provides technical supports to 
the RJ. However, the guidelines do not have the legal position of law and the auditors do 
not need to report non-compliance. Hence, it seems that the RJ is less influential than 




   16 
2.3.2   Dirty surplus accounting possibilities in the Netherlands 
Dutch accounting law is not explicit in its choice of adopting clean surplus concept of 
income. And the Guidelines (Richtlijnen) of the RJ
12 did require ‘all-inclusive’ income (RJ 
240.202) in the period considered but they allowed specific exceptions. The dirty surplus 
items included the following in the period 1988-1997: 
 
a)  Purchased goodwill can be charged directly to equity (Dutch accounting law, Section 2:389.7);
13 
b)  The creation of a revaluation reserve for the amount of the value increase of an asset, in case of 
application of current valuation (Dutch accounting law, Section 2:390.1). Decreases in the value of 
assets valued at current prices should as a rule be booked to reduce the revaluation reserve. Only if 
there is no more revaluation reserve left, should a decrease in current value be charged as a loss to the 
income statement (Dutch accounting law, Section 2:390.3); 
c)  Currency translation differences can be booked directly to equity. The Dutch law merely requires that 
the policies for the translation of amounts in foreign currency are disclosed, and that the policy for the 
recognition of currency translation differences is disclosed (Dutch accounting law, Section 2:384.5). 
The RJ requires currency translation differences with respect to activities in foreign entities to be 
reflected directly in equity (RJ 120.916-922); 
d)  The cumulative effect of changes in accounting policies (RJ 140.113-117) and the correction of 
fundamental errors (RJ 150.106) are preferably reflected directly in equity; 
e)  Expenses and capital tax in respect of an issue of shares are allowed to be charged to the share 
premium, although it is preferred to capitalize and amortize these items or to charge them directly to 
income (RJ 240.213); 
f)   The following items of a non-recurring or exceptional nature, if material, may be shown directly as 
movements in equity (RJ 240.211): 
                                                            
12 It stands for the Council for Annual Reporting, which is the Dutch private sector regulatory body.     17 
-  ‘Adjustments’ to the provision for deferred tax liabilities due to changes in the tax rate, but only 
to the extent that the deferred liability relates to revaluation of assets; 
-  Effects of a financial reorganization whereby creditors and shareholders relinquish all or part of 
their rights in connection with the write-off of a loss; 
-  Losses due to the destruction of capital (for example as the result of a natural disaster) for which 
it is not possible or not customary to take out insurance cover; adverse effects of nationalizations, 
one-off capital levies or similar forms of expropriation.”  
 
Hence, the RJ in the Netherlands allowed quite a few exceptions to the all-inclusive 
income in the period 1988-1997. There was no requirement to include a clean surplus 
income  figure  in  the  primary  financial  statements.  There  was,  however,  a  legal 
requirement to provide a statement of movements in equity in the notes to the financial 
statements  (Section  2:378.1).  For  each  item  in  equity,  i.e.  the  issued  capital  and  the 
various  separate  reserves  (Section  2:373.1),  this  statement  should  show  the  opening 
balance, additions and reductions during the financial year (classified according to their 
nature) and the closing balance.   
 
Five categories of dirty surplus accounting flows that existed in the Netherlands in the 
period  covered  in  this  chapter  will  be  considered:  goodwill  write-offs  (GW),  asset 
revaluations  (REV),  currency  translation  differences  (CUR),  sundry  items  (OTH) 
including the ‘events’ described under d. and e. above, and extraordinary dirty surplus 
items (EDSI), which are the effects of the ‘events’ described under f. above.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 Note that the Council for Annual Reporting abolished dirty surplus treatment of goodwill write-offs in 
2000 (RJ 500.218), and the Dutch government has proposed to Parliament a bill to the same effect in 2002 
(Kamerstukken Eerste en Tweede Kamer, publication number 28220).   18 
The reporting of purchased goodwill write-offs, sundry items, and extraordinary items as 
dirty  surplus  accounting  flows  is  under  a  firm’s  discretion.  A  firm  also  has  some 
influence  on  the  timing  and  valuation  of  asset  revaluations,  however,  it  has  few 
discretions on the reporting of currency translation differences.    
 
2.4   Research question development and research design 
2.4.1   Incremental value-relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows   
The value-relevance of accounting flows is conventionally defined as their statistically 
significant association with stock  returns. Hence, we regress returns on  dirty surplus 
items and on reported net income to test the incremental value-relevance of dirty surplus 
accounting flows. The purpose of this test is to discover the variations in returns that can 
be explained by dirty surplus items, i.e. incremental to reported net income. It enables us 
to examine whether or not value relevant accounting flows are excluded from income 
statement. 
 
Our first research question therefore is:  
Are dirty surplus flows incrementally value relevant over reported net income?   
 
We extend our testing windows to up to 10 years to deal with the timing problem of 
accounting  information.  The  market  incorporates  contemporary  events  in  a  timely 
fashion, whereas, earnings or components of earnings may reflect value relevant events 
of previous periods but may not record other events of a corresponding interval (Easton 
et al. 1992). Due to this timing difference in the recognition of economic events in stock 
returns and in accounting systems, the returns-earnings association should be stronger 
over longer testing windows, i.e. accumulating both returns and accounting information 
over more than one year (Easton et al. 1992). Warfield and Wild (1992) also show that   19 
the long interval approach is capable of reducing the measurement errors inherent in 
accounting systems, which is due largely to their incapability of incorporating sufficient 
information to estimate a firm’s future growth opportunities, or goodwill.  
 
Dirty surplus items are not disclosed in a firm’s primary financial statements, and they are 
presented  in  the  footnotes  only  in  the  Netherlands  as  explained  earlier.  Due  to  this 
hidden  nature,  it  is  necessary  to  accumulate  dirty  surplus  flows  over  longer  testing 
windows especially (O’Hanlon and Pope 1999). Hence, we use the long interval methods 
in the context of dirty surplus accounting flows to be able to perform a more powerful 
test (Easton et al. 1992, Warfield and Wild 1992, and O'Hanlon and Pope 1999).   
 
Investors are assumed to pursue a ‘hold and invest’ strategy, i.e. dividends are assumed to 
be reinvested to earn the equity cost of capital in the subsequent periods. The cum-
dividends stock returns at time t is accumulated over a T-period interval. The return (
T r ) 
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Our period t return lags behind the corresponding accounting period by six months. 
According to the Dutch Civil Code, article 210, firms are obliged to publish financial 
statements five months after the fiscal year end. However, they could get a one-month 
extension for the release of the statements. Hence our choice of return period allows the 
market to fully assimilate accounting information.  
 
All accounting flows are accumulated according to the method developed by Easton et 
al. (1992) and are all scaled by a firm’s market value of shareholders’ equity 6 months   20 
after the beginning of the interval. We report the results based on the third model of 
Easton  et  al.  (1992,  p128,  M3)  since  the  conclusions  are  not  sensitive  to  alternative 

























































































= =         (E2) 
 
T NI :  net  income  (i.e.  income  after  extraordinary  items), 
T DS :  total  dirty  surplus 
accounting flows, 
T GW : goodwill write-offs, 
T REV : asset revaluations, 
T CUR : foreign 
currency translation differences, 
T OTH : sundries, 
T EDSI : extraordinary dirty surplus 
items, and 
T NICL : clean surplus net income (i.e. the sum of the dirty surplus flows and 
the net income).  
 
We report results based on accumulation intervals of 1, 2, 5, and 10 years.  
 
The first model (M1) is a cross-sectional univariate regression of stock returns on net 





it e NI r 1 1 1 + + = β α ,   (M1) 
T is the interval length, and i and t refer to company i and period t respectively. 
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it e DS NI r 2 3 2 2 + + + = β β α                      (M2)  
Dirty surplus flows are relevant in explaining returns in the presence of net income if  3 β  
is statistically significant. 
 













it e CUR REV GW NI r 3 7 6 5 4 3 + + + + + = β β β β α               (M3) 
If the dirty surplus flows are incrementally relevant, the coefficients on components of 
dirty  surplus  flow  ( 5 β , 6 β ,  and  7 β )  should  be  significantly  different  from  zero.  F-
statistics are taken as the criteria for the joint significance of three components of dirty 
surplus flows.  
 
2.4.2   Relative value-relevance of clean surplus net income 
We also examine the consequence of the inclusion of dirty surplus items in currently 
reported income by comparing two income measures: pro forma clean surplus income 
and reported income. The income measure, which can explain more variances in returns, 
is considered as a better choice for equity valuation purposes, ceteris paribus. This test 
could assist the users of accounting information to choose from alternative measures of 
income. 
 
Our second research question therefore is:  
Is clean surplus net income more highly associated with returns than reported net income?    22 





it e NICL r 4 8 4 + + = β α                         (M4) 
T
it NICL  is defined as the sum of net income and dirty surplus flows of a T-period interval 
of company i in period t. Again, we accumulate both stock market and accounting flows 
using the long interval method explained earlier. In order to assess the quality of various 
income measures, M4 is compared with M1 and the J-test for non-nested models is taken 
as the criteria for model selection. 
 
2.5   Data selection and empirical results 
2.5.1   Data selection and descriptive statistics 
We gather share prices from Datastream for the whole population of Dutch listed firms 
in  the  period  of  1988-1997  and  we  hand-collect  accounting  information  from  firm’s 
financial statements. After excluding financial firms, the final sample is refined using the 
following criteria: 
 
i.  Annual price, dividends, and market value of shareholders’ equity information are 
available on the 2004 Datastream research files;  
ii.  Relevant  accounting  information  is  disclosed  in  financial  reports  and  the  firm’s 
fiscal-year ends in December; 
iii.  Information concerning returns, net income, components of dirty surplus flows, 
and market value of shareholders’ equity are available across the whole research 
period (1988-1997).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
14 We exclude sundries and extraordinary dirty surplus items from the regression analysis due to the 
presence of large numbers of zero observations.    23 
This selection procedure yields 82 Dutch firms. We list their names in appendix 2.1. For 
each  of  them  we  have  10  observations,  i.e.  820  firm-year  observations  in  total. 
Employing these selection criteria may lead to survivor bias. However, it does enable us 
to  control  for  the  negative  effects  of  extreme  values,  which  are  often  reported  by 
financially distressed firms. Table 2.1 shows the distribution of observations by industry.  
 
TABLE 2.1: Sample distributions by industry sector
15 
Industrial Sector  Number of companies 
Brewers  2 
Chemicals, commodity  4 
Other construction  4 
Distrib. ind. Comps  9 
Diversified industry  5 
Electronic equipment  12 
Engineering, general  8 
Food + drug retailers  4 
Food processors  3 
Paper  2 
Household  11 
Information technology  1 
Leisure  1 
Media  6 
Personal products  1 
Retailers, multi dept.  1 
Computer services  4 
Steel  1 
Transportation  3 
Med equip + supplies  1 
Total  82 
                                                            
15 Based on the FTSE industrial classification.   24 
 
TABLE 2.2: Descriptive data for variables used to estimate models of the association of 
net income and dirty surplus flows with returns 
 
T  N  Mean Std.dev. 25% 50% 75% %<0  %=0  %>0 
T=1 year   820 
RETU    0.214 0.404 -0.062 0.147 0.395 32 0 67
NI    0.077 0.115 0.056 0.089 0.118 7 0 93
DS    -0.029 0.082 -0.042 -0.007 0 62 13 25
GW    -0.031 0.061 -0.036 -0.002 0 53 44 3
REV    0.001 0.030 0 0 0 14 65 21
CUR    -0.001 0.011 -0.001 0 0 30 47 24
OTH    0 0.011 0 0 0 10 79 11
EDSI    0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
NICL    0.048 0.141 0.017 0.062 0.106 19 0 81
         
T=2 years  410       
RETU    0.467 0.697 -0.024 0.291 0.744 26 0 74
NI    0.184 0.209 0.116 0.185 0.261 9 0 91
DS    -0.067 0.138 -0.111 -0.030 0 69 9 22
GW    -0.072 0.117 -0.095 -0.023 0 63 34 2
REV    0.004 0.043 0 0 0 17 58 25
CUR    -0.002 0.019 -0.001 0 0 35 43 22
NICL    0.114 0.247 0.024 0.130 0.216 20 0 80
         
T=5 years  164       
RETU    1.697 2.271 0.333 1.008 1.987 15 0 85
NI    0.737 0.685 0.404 0.680 1.002 7 0 93
DS    -0.307 0.476 -0.489 -0.168 -0.019 82 5 13
GW    -0.304 0.468 -0.467 -0.135 -0.002 76 21 3
REV    0.013 0.121 0 0 0.008 20 48 32
CUR    -0.005 0.033 -0.005 0 0 39 38 23
NICL    0.446 0.656 0.169 0.407 0.701 18 0 82
   
T=10 years  82       
RETU    4.883 4.652 1.580 3.824 6.784 5 0 95
NI    2.083 1.867 1.062 1.712 2.705 7 0 93
DS    -0.898 1.311 -1.157 -0.509 -0.085 88 2 10
GW    -0.880 1.274 -1.072 -0.428 -0.061 84 12 4
REV    0.032 0.160 0 0 0.028 24 35 40
CUR    -0.001 0.053 -0.010 0 0.003 39 30 30
NICL    1.109 1.335 0.339 0.859 1.791 13 0 87
Notes:  The sample consists of all 1988-1997 listed non-financial Dutch firms that have required financial 
data  from  Datastream  and  accounting  data  in  their  financial  reports.  The  firms  also  have  complete 
information available across the period 1988-1997 and their fiscal years end in December. Observations are 
winsorized at 0.005 each tail over a 1-year interval, 0.01 over a 2-year interval, 0.015 over a 5-year interval, 
and 0.025 over a 10-year interval.  
Variable definition: T: accumulation interval of T years. N: the number of firm-year observations. 
NI: reported net income. DS: total dirty surplus flows. GW: goodwill write-offs. REV: asset revaluations. 
CUR: currency translation differences. OTH: sundries. EDSI: extraordinary dirty surplus items. NICL: 
clean surplus net income. All accounting flows are scaled by the market value of shareholders’ equity 6-
month after the beginning of the interval and are accumulated as described in session 4.1. We present the  
   25 
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of the variables
16. We winsorize the variables at 
0.005 each tail over a 1-year interval, 0.01 over a 2-year interval, 0.015 over a 5-year 
interval, and 0.025 over a 10-year interval to deal with influential observations.  
 
Table 2.2 reveals that (scaled) goodwill write-offs are by far the most important dirty 
surplus  items.  For  instance,  goodwill  write-offs  are  –3.1%  on  average  over  a  1-year 
interval, whilst the asset revaluations and the currency translation differences are both 
about  0.1%  of  the  market  value  of  shareholders’  equity.  Our  non-tabulated  statistics 
show that 60% (61%) of firms report dirty surplus flows larger than 10% of reported net 
income (clean surplus net income) in absolute terms. Extraordinary dirty surplus items 
(EDSI) are not significantly different from zero and 79% of firms don’t report sundries.  
 
And it seems that firms are more likely to write-off dirty surplus flows as net expenses. 
Clean surplus net income is only about 50% of the reported income. Taken together, the 
descriptive  statistics  suggest  that  dirty  surplus  flows  reduce  reported  net  income 
substantially.  
 
Table  2.3  provides  the  correlation  matrix.  There  is  a  significant  positive  correlation 
among net income, clean surplus net income, and returns. However, dirty surplus flows 
are not always associated with any of them.   
 
Notes to table 2.2 (continued):  
descriptive data of EDSI and OTH on an annual basis only, because of the presence of large numbers of 
zero observations. 
                                                            
16 We include the summary statistics of all five components of dirty surplus flows on yearly basis. However, 
we do not accumulate sundries or extraordinary dirty surplus items because the long term pattern of these 
flows is expected to be the same as their yearly summary statistics, i.e. these two variables contain zero 
observations mainly. The presence of large numbers of zero observations may also bias our estimation 
results; therefore, we run the incremental association model (M3) with three main components of dirty 
surplus flows: goodwill write-offs, asset revaluations, and currency translation differences.       26 
TABLE 2.3: Correlation matrix for variables used to estimate models of the association of 
net income and dirty surplus flows with returns  
 
  RETU  NI  DS  NICL 
T=1 year         
RETU     1       
NI                0.270***      1     
            (0.000)       
DS             0.066*            0.014    1   
            (0.059)            (0.684)     
NICL                0.251***               0.802***              0.577***     1 
            (0.000)            (0.000)         (0.000)   
         
T=2 years         
RETU      1       
NI                0.393***       1     
            (0.000)       
DS           -0.041              -0.084*    1   
            (0.405)             (0.090)     
NICL                0.307***                0.791***             0.525***     1 
            (0.000)            (0.000)         (0.000)   
         
T=5 years         
RETU     1       
NI               0.428***      1     
                (0.000)       
DS             -0.239***                -0.468***  1   
          (0.002)            (0.000)     
NICL              0.304***               0.723***            0.231***     1 
         (0.000)           (0.000)               (0.003)   
         
T=10 years         
RETU      1       
NI                 0.376***     1     
             (0.001)       
DS                -0.394***              -0.710***  1   
             (0.000)            (0.000)     
NICL             0.174                0.465***       0.178     1 
             (0.119)            (0.000)       (0.109)   
Note:  The sample consists of all 1988-1997 listed non-financial Dutch firms that have required financial 
data  from  Datastream  and  accounting  data  in  their  financial  reports.  The  firms  also  have  complete 
information available across the period 1988-1997 and their fiscal years end in December. Observations are 
winsorized at 0.005 each tail over a 1-year interval, 0.01 over a 2-year interval, 0.015 over a 5-year interval, 
and 0.025 over a 10-year interval.  
Variable definition: T: accumulation interval of T years. NI: reported net income. DS: total dirty 
surplus flows. NICL: clean surplus net income. All accounting flows are scaled by the market value of 
shareholders’  equity  6-month  after  the  beginning  of  the  interval  and  are  accumulated  as  described  in 
session 4.1.  
The  significance  level  of  each  correlation  coefficient  is  reported  in  parentheses  below  the 
reported correlation coefficients. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, and * significant at 
10% level.   27 
2.5.2.   Regression results 
In table 4, we present the estimation results for models 1-4 over various intervals.  Panel 
A shows the statistics for the returns-(reported) income model (M1) of up to 10 years, 
and panel B for the returns-(reported) income-total dirty surplus flows model (M2) of up 
to 10 years, and so on.   
 
The coefficients on reported net income are always positive at 1% significance level in 
the  returns-(reported)  income  model  (Panel  A).  The  results  thus  provide  consistent 
evidence that the reported income is value-relevant.  
 
Panel B shows that in the presence of reported income, the aggregated dirty surplus 
flows is insignificantly different from zero, even with accumulation intervals of up to 10 
years. Overall, our evidence implies that the aggregated dirty surplus flows are not value-
relevant, although they are large in magnitude. 
 
However,  asset  revaluations  and  currency  translation  differences  are  significant  in 
explaining returns on a yearly basis at less than 5% significance level (Panel C). Over 
longer  time  periods,  the results  are  mixed  and  it  suggests  that  asset  revaluations  are 
relevant over a two-year interval; and currency translation differences are relevant over a 
five-year interval. The F-test of joint significance of components of dirty surplus flows 
rejects the null hypothesis that none of them is able to explain variations in returns at less 
than 5% level.        
 
Both  the  coefficients  and  the  R-squares  are  higher  in  the  returns-(reported)  income 
model (0.938 and 0.071 respectively, Panel A, one year interval) than in the returns-clean 
surplus income model (0.719 and 0.063 respectively, Panel D, one year interval).    28 
TABLE 2.4: Results of the estimation of models that test the incremental (relative) value-
relevance  of  dirty  surplus  flows  (clean  surplus  income)  over  reported  net  income  in 
explaining returns  
 
Panel A: model 1  
T  N  Int.  NI  R-Sq.            
1  820 0.142  0.938  0.071            
      (0.017)***  (0.145)***                    
2  410 0.226  1.309  0.155            
    (0.041)***  (0.188)***              
5  164 0.652  1.419  0.183            
    (0.176)***  (0.219)***              
10 82  2.933  0.936  0.141            
    (0.699)***  (0.291)***              
Panel B: model 2 
T  N  Int.  NI  DS  R-Sq.          
1  820 0.151  0.935  0.306  0.075          
      (0.018)***  (0.145)***  (0.192)                
2  410 0.224  1.306  -0.042  0.155          
    (0.047)***  (0.187)***  (0.332)            
5  164 0.636  1.343  -0.233  0.185          
    (0.199)***  (0.230)***  (0.665)            
10 82  3.060  0.484  -0.907  0.174          
    (0.810)***  (0.371)  (0.666)            
Panel C: model 3 
T  N  Int.  NI  GW  REV  CUR  R-Sq.  F-test    
1  820 0.148  0.922  0.049  1.241  4.835  0.096  3.59**    
      (0.019)***  (0.150)***  (0.208)  (0.582)**  (1.822)***        
2  410 0.207  1.205  -0.517  1.658  2.112  0.175  2.98**    
    (0.046)***  (0.183)***  (0.328)  (0.991)*  (1.643)        
5  164 0.608  1.321  -0.500  0.541  8.586  0.212  4.08***    
    (0.230)***  (0.225)***  (0.604)  (2.400)  (2.669)***        
10 82  2.690  0.483  -1.273  1.740  -10.445  0.227  1.98**    
    (0.688)***  (0.264)*  (0.570)**  (3.189)  (8.169)        
Panel D: model 4 
T  N  Int.  NICL  R-sq.  Nn. (M1)  Nn. (M4)        
1  820 0.180  0.719  0.063  0.411  0.690        
      (0.014)***  (0.113)***     (0.254)  (0.242)***           
2  410 0.368  0.867  0.094  -0.035  1.022        
    (0.036)***  (0.165)***    (0.382)  (0.281)***        
5  164 1.227  1.053  0.093  -0.034  1.018        
    (0.235)***  (0.328)***    (0.678)  (0.435)**        
10 82  4.213  0.605  0.030  -0.008  1.002        
    (0.785)***  (0.435)    (1.032)  (0.391)**        
Notes:  The sample consists of all 1988-1997 listed non-financial Dutch firms that have required 
financial data from Datastream and accounting data in their financial reports. The firms also have complete 
information available across the period 1988-1997 and their fiscal years end in December. Observations are    29 
The J-test of non-nested models always prefers reported income to clean surplus income 
over various testing windows because the statistics suggest that clean surplus income 
doesn’t encompass reported income in explaining returns (Panel D, the last column). The 
reported income seems to be more persistent than the clean surplus income, and they are 
the preferred measure of economic income.    
 
We  observe  a  trend  of  increasing  returns-income  associations  as  the  accumulation 
intervals are lengthened: the R-squares increase from 6-10% to more than 10%. Though, 
there is a decrease over the 10-year window in model 1, 2, and 4. This decrease may be 
owing to the effects of outliers, and may also be because the number of observations is 
reduced substantially in that period.  
 
2.5.3.   Robustness tests 
In addition, we perform a number of robustness tests. First, since our data are pooled 
across time, it is likely that autocorrelation appears in our sample. We therefore, re-run all 
our models with the fixed-effect panel estimation procedure along the time dimension.  
Notes to table 2.4 (continued):  
winsorized at 0.005 each tail over a 1-year interval, 0.01 over a 2-year interval, 0.015 over a 5-year interval, 
and 0.025 over a 10-year interval.  
Variable definition: T: accumulation interval of T years. N: the number of firm-year observations. 
Int.: intercepts of the model. NI: reported net income. DS: total dirty surplus flows. GW: goodwill write-
offs. REV: asset revaluations. CUR: currency translation differences. NICL: clean surplus net income. All 
accounting flows are scaled by the market value of shareholders’ equity 6-month after the beginning of the 
interval and are accumulated as described in session 4.1. 




it r 1 1 1 + + = β α  






it r 2 3 2 2 + + + = β β α  










it r 3 7 6 5 4 3 + + + + + = β β β β α  




it r 4 8 4 + + = β α  
 
The panels labeled M1, M2, M3, and M4 report the estimated coefficients of the respective models. The 
sub-columns labeled the variables’ names report the estimated coefficients of the relevant variables. R-Sq.: 
R-squares of the estimated models. J(M1)/J(M4) represents the non-nested J-test assuming that M1/M4 is 
the true model and it reports the coefficients of the predicted value from M4/M1 in the artificial nesting 
model.  Huber-White  standard  errors  are  reported  in  parentheses  below  the  reported  coefficient.  *** 
significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level.   30 
 Second, the models are estimated on an annual basis to examine the variations in the 
value-relevance of dirty surplus flows across time. Third, we accumulate our data with 
the other two long interval methods developed by Easton et al. (1992) and the method 
developed  by  O’Hanlon  and  Pope  (1999)  to  check  if  the  results  are  influenced  by 
different accumulation procedures. Fourth, we winsorize our 1-year data at 0.0025 each 
tail, 2-year data at 0.005, 5-year data at 0.01, and 10-year data at 0.02 each tail to verify 
the results with alternative definitions of outliers. Our conclusions are supported with 
these robustness tests. 
 
2.6.   Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
This chapter tests the value-relevance of dirty surplus flows with both an incremental and 
a relative association study. We find that aggregated dirty surplus items are not value-
relevant over 1, 2, 5, and 10-year intervals. However, there is some evidence that assets 
revaluations  and  currency  translation  differences  have  explanatory  power  for  stock 
returns.  
 
Reported income appears to be a more relevant measure of firm value than clean surplus 
income  in  the  period  considered  in  the  Netherlands,  although  both  of  them  are 
associated with returns.  
 
However, the conclusions have to be interpreted with caution when drawing standard 
setting  inferences  because  they  are  only  from  an  equity  valuation  perspective.  Other 
empirical  studies  could  investigate  the  influence  of  accounting  information  on 
contracting  costs  for  instance.  It  should  be  noted  that  by  providing  more  reliable 
information  the  political  and  auditors’  liability  costs  (Kothari  et  al.  1988)  could  be 
reduced even if the information is not relevant for security valuation.    31 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
The firms in the final sample 
Number Name of the firms   
1  Aalberts Industries 
2  ACF Holding N.V. (97: Brocacef) 
3  Ahrend Groep 
4  AIR (Automobiel Industrie Rotterdam) 
5  Akzo   
6  Alanheri   
7  Amsterdam Rubber Cultuur Maatschappij (RCMA) 
8  Arag Holding 
9  BAM Holding 
10  Batenburg Beheer 
11  Beer’s Zonen 
12  Blydestein – Willink 
13  Boer, de,  Winkelbedrijf (97: De Boer Unigro) 
14  Boer, de, Drukkerij (Boekhoven) (93: Roto Smeets de Boer) 
15  Boskalis Westminster 
16  Burgman Heybroek 
17  Cate, ten, Nijverdal 
18  Cindu-Key & Kramer (CKK) / Cindu Int. 
19  CVG (Crown v. Gelder c ) 
20  Dico International 
21  Dorp Groep 
22  Drie Electronics 
23  Econosto   
24  Elsevier   
25  Eriks Holding 
26  Frans Maas Beheer 
27  Gamma Holding 
28  Gelderse Papier Groep 
29  Getronics   
30  Geveke Electr. Int. / Geveke 
31  Gouda Vuurvast 
32  Grolsch Bierbr. 
33  Groothandelsgebouwen 
34  GTI-Holding 
35  Hagemeyer 
36  HBG (Hollandse Beton Groep) 
37  Heineken   
38  Hoek Loos ('s Machine & Zuurstoffabriek) 
39  Hoogovens 
40  Hunter Douglas 
41  Internatio Muller 
42  Klene's    
43  Koppelpoort Holding 
44  Krasnapolsky 
45  Kuhne + Heitz 
46  Landre & Gilderman   34 
47  Macintosh Confectie 
48  Melle, van   
49  Mulder Boskoop 
50  Naeff   
51  NAGRON (Nat. Grondbezit) 
52  NBM Bouw / NBM Amstelland 
53  NEDAP   
54  Nedlloyd   
55  Nedschroef Holding 
56  Neways Electroniscs 
57  NKF Holding 
58  Norit   
59  Nutricia Gem. Bezit / Ver. Bedr. 
60  Oce van der Grinten 
61  Ordina Beheer 
62  OTRA   
63  Pakhoed   
64  Philips   
65  Polynorm   
66  Porceleyne Fles 
67  Reesink   
68  Rood Testhouse 
69  Stork   
70  Schuitema 
71  Schuttersveld 
72  Simac Techniek 
73  Telegraaf de, Holding 
74  Textielgroep Twenthe 
75  Tulip Computers 
76  Twent. Kabel Holding 
77  Ubbink   
78  VNU verz. Bez. 
79  Vredestein 
80  Wolters Kluwer 
81  Wegener Arcade ( Wegener Tijl) 
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Chapter 3 




3.1   Introduction  
I investigate the magnitude and relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows in European 
Union  (EU)  member  states.  Dirty  surplus  flows  bypass  the  income  statement  (i.e. 
earnings) and are recorded directly to shareholders’ equity. Accounting practitioners, and 
regulators,  in  particular,  appear  to  prefer  to  restrict  dirty  surplus  flows,  as  the  clean 
surplus earnings are thought to be more informative about firm value changes (see e.g. 
Smith and Reither 1996, and Linsmeier et al. 1997). Other authors (see e.g. Black 1993), 
however, argue that dirty surplus flows are performance irrelevant; therefore, they should 
not be taken into earnings.   
 
Formally, the clean surplus concept (Preinreich 1938, Paton and Littleton 1940, Edwards 
and  Bell  1961,  Peasnell 1982,  Brief  and  Peasnell  1996,  and Christensen  and  Demski 
2003) requires that accounting earnings is equal to the difference of year-end book value 















18. However, in practice, it is common 
to  write  off  certain  accounting  flows:  such  as  goodwill  write-offs,  upward  asset 
revaluation, and sundries etc., from shareholders’ equity. The differences between clean 
surplus earnings and reported earnings are called as dirty surplus flows. 
   36 
In addition to an interest that accounting practitioners and regulators may have in clean 
surplus earnings, accounting-based valuation models create theoretical interest in clean 
surplus earnings. Indeed, the clean surplus relation also lies behind residual-income based 
valuation models (Ohlson 1995, Feltham and Ohlson 1995, Bernard 1995, Walker 1997, 
Dechow et al. 1999, Ohlson 2003, and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 2003), which link 
equity  valuation  directly  with  observable  accounting  variables.  Hence,  clean  surplus 
income appears to be a primary input for firm valuation.  
 
Empirical studies show that the magnitude of dirty surplus flows to be economically 
significant  in  New  Zealand,  UK,  and  the  US  (see  e.g.  Hand  and  Landsman  2005, 
O’Hanlon  and  Pope  1999,  and  Cahan  et  al.  2000).  Nonetheless,  mixed  results  are 
documented about their relevance in firm valuation (see e.g. Easton et al. 1993, Aboody 
et al. 1999, Dhaliwal et al. 1999, Lo and Lys 2000, Biddle and Choi 2003, Kanagaretnam 
et al. 2004, and Chambers et al. 2005).  
 
EU is actively promoting the ‘true and fair’ view and a ‘cleaner’ income statement via a 
full adaptation of international accounting standards (Zeff et al. 1999, and Alexander and 
Archer 2001). The clean surplus concept has clearly gained popularity among standard 
setters in EU member states. For example, UK abolished extraordinary items in 1992 
(FRS  3),  and  dirty  surplus  treatment  of  goodwill  write-offs  in  1998  (FRS  10).  The 
Netherlands eliminated the goodwill write-offs in 2000 (RJ 500.218).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
17 I  wish  to thank  workshop participants on capital market  research in accounting held in Frankfurt, 
Germany, December 11-13, 2003, accounting and GSS Ph.D. seminar participants at Tilburg University, 
and  2005  EAA  Annual  Congress  in  Goteborg,  Sweden,  especially  Willem  Buijink,  Wayne  Landsman, 
Laurence van Lent, Steven Ongena, Maarten Pronk, and Grzegorz Trojanowski for their helpful comments 
and suggestions on a earlier version of this chapter.     
18 BV (t): equity book value at the fiscal end of period t; NICL (t): clean surplus net income in period t; 
NETCAP (t): net capital inflows in period t; DIV (t): dividends paid in period t.   37 
Standard setters’ major concern about dirty surplus flows is that the professionals and 
the public could encounter difficulties in extracting value relevant information if such 
flows are not recognized in a systematic and standard format
19 (Hirst and Hopkins 1998, 
Lipe 1998, and Maines and Mcdaniel 2000, and Chambers et al. 2005).  
 
This study provides evidence on the magnitude and the relevance of dirty surplus flows 
in EU member states in a recent period (1993-2002). I find that dirty surplus flows are 
usually negative; firms tend to write off net expenses via dirty surplus flows. These flows 
also seem to be economically important since they are 6% of reported earnings, and 8% 
of clean surplus earnings on average.  
 
I then evaluate the relevance of clean surplus earnings and reported earnings using both 
relative and incremental methods
20. In addition, I also examine the role of dirty surplus 
flows in the prediction of future earnings in 14 European Union states.  
 
Overall, reported earnings are more highly associated with stock returns than the clean 
surplus earnings in EU  member states and it  seems that dirty  surplus flows are less 
persistent than reported earnings. However, evidence shows that dirty surplus flows are 
incrementally relevant in explaining security returns in Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and UK.  
 
Dirty surplus accounting flows are also able to predict 1-period ahead net income in 
Belgium  and  the  UK,  and  they  are  associated  with  1,  and  2-period  ahead  operating 
                                                            
19  Bushee  and  Leuz  (2005),  for  example,  document  that  mandated  disclosure  regulation  reduces 
information asymmetry and increases liquidity. Lee et al. (2004) also suggest that the choice of reporting 
clean surplus income is positively related to firm’s overall disclosure quality.  
20 In contrast to chapter 2, I start with the relative association study, then continue with the incremental 
association study.    38 
income  growth  in  Denmark, Germany, and Italy, and with 1-period ahead operating 
income growth only in Finland and Sweden.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the literature 
review  and  hypothesis  development.  The  data  collection  process  and  methods  are 
described in section 3. Section 4 is the analysis of results and I conclude in section 5.     
 
3.2  Literature review and hypothesis development 
3.2.1  Existing evidence on the magnitude of dirty surplus flows.  
Previous literature documents that, on average, dirty surplus flows are –0.5% of market 
value (median –0.4%) in the UK
21 (O’Hanlon and Pope 1999), and –0.2% (median 0.0%) 
in the US
22 (Dhaliwal et al. 1999). Similar results with more recent data can be found for 
US firms in Biddle and Choi (2003), Chambers et al. (2005), New Zealand firms in Cahan 
et al. (2000), Canadian firms in Kanagaretnam et al. (2004), and European firms in Isidro 
et al. (2004), and Australian firms in Brimble and Hodgson (2004), etc. Besides this, 
descriptive information about dirty surplus flows on per share basis can be found in 
Giner  and  Pardo  (2004)  for  European  firms;  and  Kanagaretnam  et  al.  (2004)  for 
Canadian firms.  
 
Previous  studies  also  show  that  dirty  surplus  flows  are  an  important  component  of 
reported income. They are 4.3% of operating profits in the UK (O’Hanlon and Pope 
1999) and the absolute value of dirty surplus items is 15.7% of absolute value of clean 
surplus income, 3.58% of equity book value, and 1.47% of total assets in the US
23 (Lo 
                                                            
21 Data dated 1972-1992 
22 Data dated 1994-1995 
23 Data dated 1962-1997   39 
and Lys 2000). Hand and Landsman
24 (2005) also report that US firms disclose 2 millions 
US dollars of dirty surplus flows on average.  
 
To summarize, dirty surplus flows seem to be economically significant in magnitude. 
This may explain the attention that standard setters, practitioners, and academics paying 
to them.  
 
3.2.2  Empirical evidence on the relevance of dirty surplus flows 
O’Hanlon and Pope (1999) conclude that dirty surplus flows are not incrementally value 
relevant in the presence of operating profits even over accumulation intervals
25 of up to 
20 years. In their study, total dirty surplus flows and its five components are added as 
additional explanatory variables to the returns-earnings model. Overall, none of the dirty 
surplus flows is able to explain the variations in returns.  
 
Complementary  to  O’Hanlon  and  Pope  (1999),  Dhaliwal  et  al.  (1999)  compare  the 
relevance of reported GAAP income with four other ‘cleaner’ income measures, which 
include  selected  dirty  surplus  components
26  and  reported  earnings.  Among  the  four 
components of dirty surplus flows listed in their study, the marketable securities provide 
marginal improvements over the returns-earnings specification with firms in financial 
sector  only.  Overall,  ‘cleaner’  income  measures  do not  perform better  than  reported 
GAAP income. The authors therefore question the necessity of promoting SFAS 130 for 
more clean surplus financial statements (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
no. 130, Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1997).  
                                                            
24 Data dated 1974-1996 
25 The only exception is that the extraordinary items are significant at 5% level over 10-year interval. 
26 Marketable securities, the change in the cumulative foreign currency translation adjustment, the change 
in additional minimum pension liability in excess of unrecognised prior service costs, and dirty surplus 
flows in total.   40 
In contrast to these studies, Biddle and Choi (2003), and Chambers et al. (2005) also 
conduct  thorough  investigation  on  both  relative  and  incremental  value-relevance  of 
disaggregated  and  aggregated  dirty  surplus  accounting  flows  using  U.S.  data.  Their 
models allow both income levels and income changes to account for the variations in 
either cumulative raw returns, or abnormal returns. Clean surplus income as defined in 
SFAS 130 
27 seems to dominant traditional net income in investors’ pricing decision and 
increases corporate transparency.  
 
Moreover,  Kanagaretnam  et  al.  (2004)  claim  that  dirty  surplus  flows  are  relevant  in 
explaining firm value using Canadian data. In New Zealand, Cahan et al. (2000) conclude 
that clean surplus income is more relevant to firm value than reported income, but the 
two  dirty  surplus  items  under  their  investigation,  i.e.  asset  revaluations  and  foreign 
currency translations, do not explain firm value beyond earnings. 
 
At disaggregated level, Easton et al. (1993), Barth and Clinch (1998), and Aboody et al. 
(1999) present consistent evidence on the relevance of asset revaluation. Nonetheless, the 
majorities of empirical studies provide hardly any evidence on the relevance of dirty 
surplus  flows,  see  for  example: Collins  and  Salatke  (1993),  Bartov (1997),  and  Louis 
(2003)  on  foreign  currency  translation  differences
28;  and  Moehrle  et  al.  (2001)  on 
goodwill write-offs.   
 
As existing empirical evidence is not conclusive on the value-relevance of dirty surplus 
flows,  it  seems  helpful  to  conduct  a  comprehensive  study  in  EU  countries  before 
enforcing clean surplus income reporting.  
                                                            
27 Giner and Pardo (2004) make similar suggestions about dirty surplus flows in EU, and Brimble and 
Hodgson (2004) in Australia.     41 
3.2.3  Hypothesis development 
3.2.3.1 The association of income and dirty surplus flows with returns 
Commonly  value-relevance  studies  use  relative  and  incremental  association  methods 
(Biddle  et  al.  1995,  Kothari  2001,  and  Holthausen  and  Watts  2001).  The  analyses 
examine the relevance of alternative accounting items, i.e. clean surplus income or dirty 
surplus flows, over or beyond the benchmark item, i.e. reported GAAP net income. In 
this study, first I compare two income measures, i.e. clean surplus income and reported 
income,  on  the  basis  of  their  ability  in  explaining  security  returns.  Then  I  test  the 
association between dirty surplus flows and returns in the presence of reported GAAP 
net income. Hence, two hypotheses are developed.  
 
H1: Reported net income is more relevant than clean surplus net income in explaining 
returns.  
H2:  Dirty  surplus  flows  are  not  incrementally  relevant  in  explaining  returns  in  the 
presence of reported net income. 
 
3.2.3.2 The association with future income and operating income growth 
A test on the use of clean surplus accounting information in predicting future income 
highlights the importance of core accounting information, which is closely related to 
future firm performance. Two related hypotheses are developed. 
 
H3: Reported net income is more relevant than clean surplus net income in predicting 
future net income.  
H4: Dirty surplus flows are not incrementally relevant in predicting future net income in 
the presence of current reported net income. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
28 Soo and Soo (1994) suggest that there is no difference in the market valuation of foreign currency   42 
If H3 is rejected, clean surplus income seems to be better than reported net income at 
predicting firm performance. If H4 is rejected, then dirty surplus flows are informative 
about future firm performance.  
 
Net  income  is  reported  after  non-reoccurring  items  and  it  incorporates  also  firm’s 
financing decision. To assess the relevance of dirty surplus flows in the context of firm 
operating performance, I also use dirty surplus flows as predictors of operating income 
growth  in  the  presence  of  other  control  variables,  such  as:  current  operating 
performance, risk, growth, and size. Hypothesis 5 tests the association between dirty 
surplus flows and future firm operating performance.  
 
H5: Dirty surplus flows are not relevant in predicting future firm operating performance. 
 
A rejection of hypothesis 5 implies that dirty surplus flows are directly related to future 
firm operating performance. 
 
3.3  Data and method 
3.3.1  Data  
The  data  are  collected  from  GLOBAL  Vantage  active/industrial  research  file  dated 
December 2003 for the period of 1993-2002. The study is limited to industrial firms with 
consolidated financial statements that are prepared under local GAAP. These firms are 
domiciled and listed in one of the 14 EU
29 countries. Firms that changed their fiscal years 
during 1993-2002 are excluded from the analysis. The following criterions are applied to 
the selection of the final sample
30. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
translation differences. 
29 I exclude Luxembourg from the analysis due to a lack of observations. 
30 I exclude observations with obvious data coding errors, e.g. firm reports dividend payments larger than 
the shareholder’s equity.   43 
1.  Sample firms have enough data to compute required variables; 
2.  The market value of shareholders’ equity is larger than 1 million Euro in 
order to eliminate potential problems related to small denominators; 
3.  Shareholders’ equity is positive; 
4.  The  market  value  of  shareholders’  equity  deflated  net  income,  clean 
surplus net income, and dirty surplus flows are in the range of –1 and 1. 
 
Observations that fall in the top or bottom percentile of testing variables distribution in 
each analysis are considered as outliers and are excluded from that analysis.  
 
I measure reported net income (NI G182) as the sum of net income before extraordinary 
items  and  extraordinary  items.  The  pro  forma  clean  surplus  income  (NICL)  are 
calculated on the basis of clean surplus relation, which requires earnings to be the change 
of shareholders’ equity net of the effects of transactions with equity holders, i.e. the 
issuances or the repurchases of stocks, or the distributions of dividends. An alternative 
calculation is presented in appendix 3.1 to check the validity of the first calculation, and 
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Hence, the clean surplus income (NICL) is defined as follows
31: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i CAPS PRC SCO PSTK CSTK TSTK DVT SEQ NICL , , , . . , , , , ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ + + ∆ =
 
Where: 
t i SEQ , ∆  (SEG G193): Changes of shareholders’ equity of company i in period t;  
t i DVT ,  (DVT G425): Total dividend payments of company i in period t; 
t i TSTK , ∆  (TSTK G180): Repurchase of treasury stock of company i in period t; 
t i CSTK , ∆  (CSTK G177): Issuances of common stock of company i in period t; 
t i PSTK , ∆  (PSTK G268): Issuances of preferred stock of company i in period t; 
t i SCO , ∆  (SCO G179): Issuances of other share capital of company i in period t; 
t i PRC , ∆  (PRC G178): Issuances of participation rights certificates of company i in period t; 
t i CAPS , ∆  (CAPS G181): Changes of capital surplus of company i in period t. 
 
Note that this formula is corrected for balance sheet presentation format, i.e. before or 
after  profits  appropriation.  Necessary  adjustments  are  made  to  reflect  the  timing  of 
dividends  payments  in  each  profit  appropriation  status
32.  For  example,  if  current 
shareholders’ equity is reported after profits appropriation (excluding dividends), we add 
back  current  period  dividends  to  clean  surplus  net  income;  and  if  previous  period 
shareholders’ equity is reported after profits appropriation (excluding dividends in period 
t-1), then we add back previous period dividends. Similarly, we do not add back dividend 
                                                            
31 Similar measures can be found in Lo and Lys (2000), Dhaliwal et al. (1999), and Biddle and Choi (2003). 
My  measure  takes  into  account  country  level  differences  but  is  subject  to  the  appropriateness  of  the 
classification made by GLOBAL Vantage. I do not follow the method in Hand and Landsman (2005), who 
retrieves the net capital contribution from cash flow statement. Cash flow statements are not presented 
consistently in Europe.    
32 See appendix 3.1 for further explanation.   45 
of a particular period if firms choose to report pre-profits appropriation shareholders’ 
equity in that period 
 
All  accounting  variables  are  deflated  by  market  value  of  shareholders’  equity  at  the 
beginning of the fiscal year.   
 
3.3.2  Method 
3.3.2.1 Test of the association of income and dirty surplus flows with returns    
To enhance the comparability with previous studies (O’Hanlon and Pope 1999, Dhaliwal 
et al. 1999, and Biddle and Choi 2003), I use the conventional returns-net income model. 
Security returns are regressed on net income deflated by market value of shareholders’ 
equity  at  the  beginning  of  the  fiscal  year.  Although  economically  intuitive  rationale 
suggests  that  price  models  are  less  biased  in  the  estimated  coefficients  (Kothari  and 
Zimmerman 1995, and Barth and Kallapur 1996), the returns-net income model seems to 
fulfill econometrics properties better than the price models, or earnings changes models 
(Kothari 1992, and Easton 1999).  
 
The returns-net income model is referred to as the benchmark model, the first model of 
interest substitutes net income by clean surplus income, and the second model includes 
dirty  surplus  accounting  flows  as  additional  explanatory  variables  in  the  benchmark 
model.  
 
Hence,  the  benchmark  model  (M1)  is  a  regression  of  returns  on  deflated  reported 
income after extraordinary items
33.   
1 1 0 e NI a a R + + =                   (1)   46 
R is defined as stock returns inclusive of dividends. NI denotes reported income deflated 
by market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of the interval.  
 
To  test  the  first  hypothesis,  I  compare  model  1  with  model  2  (M2)  for  the  relative 
informativeness of clean surplus income.  
2 1 0 e NICL a a R + ′ + ′ =                  (2) 
 
NICL is the pro forma measure of clean surplus income, which is calculated on the basis 
of standard clean surplus relation (see section 3.1 for details). I compare the reported 
income and the clean surplus income using non-nested J-test.    
 
Model 3 includes scaled dirty surplus flows into the benchmark model in order to test the 
incremental value-relevance of dirty surplus flows in the presence of reported income 
(hypothesis 2).  
3 2 1 0 e DS a NI a a R + ′ ′ + ′ ′ + ′ ′ =               (3) 
 
DS is defined as the difference between the reported net income and the clean surplus 
income, and it is deflated by the market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of 
the interval. If  2 a′ ′  is significant, then dirty surplus flows are relevant beyond net income. 





                                                                                                                                                                      
33 For notational ease, firm and time identifiers are dropped.    47 
3.3.2.2 Test of the association with future net income or future operating income 
Aboody et al. (1999) point out that prices and returns incorporate firms’ investing and 
financing decisions. These omitted variables, if correlated with accounting earnings, may 
bias estimation results reported by conventional returns-earnings regression. Also current 
returns contain more forward looking information than the financial statement could 
incorporate (Collins et al. 1994). At firm level, if the clean surplus income or dirty surplus 
flows are informative to future firm performance, it is expected that they should be 
significantly associated with leading period net income. Thus, in order to test hypothesis 
3 and 4, I start with a benchmark regression of one-period ahead net income on current 
net income (M4), then a regression of one-period ahead net income on clean surplus 
income (M5), and finally, on current net income and dirty surplus flows (M6).  
4 1 0 e NI a a NIF + + =                   (4) 
5 1 0 e NICL a a NIF + ′ + ′ =                 (5) 
6 2 1 0 e DS a NI a a NIF + ′ ′ + ′ ′ + ′ ′ =               (6) 
 
NIF denotes one period ahead net income deflated by the market value of shareholders’ 
equity  at  the  beginning  of  the  period,  and  all  other  variables  are  defined  as  that  in 
previous session. The non-nested J-test is used to compare M4 and M5, and the t test 
evaluates the relevance of dirty surplus flows in predicting future net income. 
 
In  addition  to  that,  Bernard  (1993)  suggests  that  it  is  important  to  provide  direct 
evidence  on  the  relation  between  accounting  information  and  future  firm  operating 
performance. Reported net income includes components, which reflect firms’ choice of 
depreciation methods, tax payments, and financing decisions, which are not relevant to 
operating  performance.  Hypothesis  5  tests  the  relevance  of  dirty  surplus  accounting   48 
flows  to  future  firm  operating  performance  after  controlling  for  firm  specific 
characteristics.  It  requires  a  regression  of  future  operating  income  growth  on  dirty 
surplus flows and other control variables (M7 and M8). 
7 4 3 2 1 0 e ATLOG b MB b DS b NIOP b b NIOPF + + + + + =         (7) 
8 4 3 2 1 0 e ATLOG b MB b DS b NIOP b b NIOPFF + ′ + ′ + ′ + ′ + =         (8) 
 
NIOPF (F) is the one (two)-period ahead operating income growth. NIOP is the current 
operating income growth. DS is the dirty surplus flows. MB is the market to book ratio 
at fiscal year end. ATLOG is the log of total assets at fiscal year end. All variables, except 
the market to book ratio, are deflated by the market value of shareholders’ equity at the 
beginning of the period. The models used here are the same as those in Aboody et al. 
(1999). 
 
If  2 b  ( 2 b′) is significant, then dirty surplus flows are relevant in predicting one (two)-
period  ahead  future  firm  operating  performance  after  controlling  for  growth 
opportunities, risks, and firm size. This equation is estimated using fixed effect panel 




3.4.1  The magnitude of dirty surplus accounting flows 
Table 3.1 presents selected summary statistics of dirty surplus accounting flows. The 
average dirty surplus flows is –0.4% of firms’ market value of equity in Europe, and 
among them, Greece records –3.6%, which is the lowest, and Sweden reports 1.8%, the 
                                                            
34 I run the model with firm-year observations that have required variables for that particular model in 
order to maintain  maximuim number of observations for each test. As a consequence, the number of 
observations in each test is not the same. Hence, I present the summary statistics for observations used in 
each tests, and these statistics are comparable with each other.   49 
highest. Except in Sweden, firms are more likely to report non-positive dirty surplus 
flows  and  the  country  specific  medians  range  from  –2.1%  (in  Greece)  to  0%  (in 
Germany and Ireland). The medians are comparable to that reported in the US (0.000, in 
Dhaliwal et al. 1999) and in the UK (-0.004, in O’Hanlon and Pope 1999).  
 
The standard deviations are comparable from country to country with 5.2% the lowest 
(Belgium) and 10.9 % the highest (Austria). The summary statistics, thus, suggest that 
firms tend to write off net dirty surplus expenses from balance sheet, instead of including 
them in income statement.  
 
Table 3.1 also shows the means, the medians, and the standard deviations of dirty surplus 
flows when they are expressed in percentage of book value of shareholders’ equity or 
total asset. The sign and the magnitude of these ratios are similar to the market value 
deflated ratios.       
 
In their un-deflated terms, firm reports more than 25 million dirty surplus flows on 
average in the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The statistics in these countries are 
much larger in magnitude and more volatile than that reported in other EU countries. 
However, the medians are very close across various EU states, and they range from –4.93 
million Euro (in Greece) to 0.17 million Euro (in Sweden). It seems that they could be 
economically significant components of earnings. The relatively large amount of dirty 
surplus flows could potentially draw the attention of European standard setters.   50 
TABLE 3.1: Summary statistics of the magnitude of dirty surplus accounting flows  
 
DS  DSSEQ  DSAT  DSABS  Number of firm-year 
observations  Mean  Median  Std  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std. 
Austria  146  -0.010  -0.003  0.109  -0.005  -0.004  0.123  -0.002  -0.001  0.031  -0.92  -0.13  10.81 
Belgium  351  -0.024  -0.017  0.052  -0.038  -0.031  0.075  -0.014  -0.010  0.025  -22.48  -1.66  89.46 
Denmark  459  -0.006  -0.002  0.073  -0.022  -0.003  0.123  -0.009  -0.001  0.047  -3.06  -0.11  23.20 
Finland  402  0.007  -0.002  0.078  0.002  -0.002  0.091  -0.001  -0.001  0.041  1.67  -0.20  35.58 
France  2040  -0.022  -0.014  0.056  -0.039  -0.024  0.087  -0.014  -0.008  0.031  -12.60  -1.16  50.59 
Germany  1259  -0.003  0.000  0.064  -0.004  -0.001  0.116  -0.002  0.000  0.026  -1.26  -0.03  16.68 
Greece  229  -0.036  -0.021  0.056  -0.086  -0.051  0.140  -0.032  -0.023  0.049  -11.73  -4.93  22.32 
Ireland  194  -0.005  -0.001  0.086  -0.016  -0.001  0.158  0.000  0.000  0.062  -0.73  -0.05  25.96 
Italy  535  0.002  -0.002  0.072  0.002  -0.004  0.093  0.000  -0.001  0.031  -7.52  -0.26  104.59 
Netherlands  744  -0.025  -0.010  0.061  -0.075  -0.017  0.207  -0.020  -0.006  0.051  -28.47  -0.96  148.00 
Portugal  169  -0.021  -0.014  0.091  -0.049  -0.020  0.125  -0.013  -0.008  0.036  -38.47  -1.27  130.86 
Spain  668  -0.016  -0.011  0.053  -0.024  -0.015  0.068  -0.009  -0.005  0.026  -25.98  -1.73  105.21 
Sweden  703  0.018  0.002  0.093  0.048  0.004  0.222  0.027  0.002  0.126  1.56  0.17  54.18 
UK  4903  0.008  -0.001  0.086  -0.007  -0.002  0.153  0.001  -0.001  0.061  -0.85  -0.07  69.42 
EU  12802  -0.004  -0.004  0.076  -0.016  -0.008  0.141  -0.004  -0.003  0.056  -7.11  -0.37  73.25 
Notes:   The sample consist of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have GLOBAL Vantage active/industrial research file data needed to calculate returns, net income, and dirty surplus 
flows and the market value of shareholders’ equity deflated net income, clean surplus income, and dirty surplus flows are required to be in the range of –1 and 1. This study is 
limited  to  non-financial  European  firms  with  consolidated  financial  statements  that  are  prepared  under  local  GAAP  and  are reported  consistent  fiscal  year.  Their  market 
capitalization should be larger than 1 million Euros and the shareholders’ equity record a positive number. Observations fall into the top or bottom one percent at each tail of 
concerned variables are identified as outliers and are excluded.  
Variable definitions: DS: dirty surplus accounting flows; DSSEQ: dirty surplus accounting flows and shareholders’ equity deflated by book value of shareholders’ equity; 
DSFAT: dirty surplus flows deflated by total assets; DSABS: dirty surplus flows; and all accounting variables are deflated by market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning 
of the fiscal year, except DSSEQ and DSAT.    51 
3.4.2  The value-relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows 
3.4.2.1 Results of the association of income and dirty surplus flows with returns 
The summary statistics of variables used to estimate models and the estimation results 
are presented in table 3.2-3.9.  
 
Table  3.2  contains  the  summary  statistics  of  the  variables  used  to  estimate  returns-
reported  income,  returns-clean  surplus  income,  and  returns-reported  income-dirty 
surplus accounting flows model. The average return in Europe is 9%, which is below 
than that reported in the U. S (15%, in both Dhaliwal et al. 1999, and Biddle and Choi 
2003),  with  Greece  and  Spain  as  exceptions  of  extremely  high  equity  returns.  The 
reported  income  is  from  3%  to  7%  of  market  value  of  shareholders’  equity.  The 
characteristics of dirty surplus flows in this sample are similar to table 3.1.  
 
Table  3.3  shows  that  net  income  and  clean  surplus  income  are  positively  related  to 
returns in 13 out of 14 countries at 1% significance level, except Austria.
35. I exclude 
Austria and Greece from subsequent analysis. 
 
The  coefficients  of  reported  income  is  from  0.88  the  lowest  (Germany)  to  2.02  the 
highest (Portugal), which is close to the estimates in Dhaliwal et al. (1999) and Biddle and 
Choi (2003). Overall, the explanatory power of the return-net income regression is 11%. 




                                                            
35 Over a period of 10 years, there are only 154 observations available.     52 
TABLE 3.2: Summary statistics of the variables used to estimate the models of the associations between returns and net income, dirty surplus 
flows, and clean surplus income  
 
R  NI  DS  NICL  Number of  
firm-year observations  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std. 
Austria  154  0.04  0.02  0.24  0.05  0.06  0.15  -0.005  -0.002  0.13  0.05  0.05  0.17 
Belgium  359  0.07  0.03  0.37  0.06  0.06  0.09  -0.025  -0.017  0.05  0.03  0.03  0.09 
Denmark  468  0.04  0.00  0.37  0.06  0.07  0.12  0.000  -0.001  0.09  0.06  0.05  0.13 
Finland  400  0.08  0.03  0.41  0.07  0.07  0.10  0.005  -0.002  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.12 
France  2109  0.06  0.02  0.45  0.04  0.05  0.11  -0.022  -0.013  0.06  0.02  0.03  0.11 
Germany  1312  0.03  0.00  0.33  0.03  0.04  0.12  -0.001  0.000  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.12 
Greece  235  0.38  -0.14  1.28  0.05  0.04  0.05  -0.037  -0.023  0.05  0.01  0.02  0.06 
Ireland  202  0.13  0.07  0.44  0.07  0.08  0.08  -0.003  0.000  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.11 
Italy  555  0.06  0.00  0.44  0.03  0.04  0.09  0.005  -0.002  0.08  0.03  0.03  0.11 
Netherlands  776  0.07  0.04  0.36  0.07  0.08  0.10  -0.026  -0.010  0.07  0.04  0.06  0.11 
Portugal  175  0.10  0.03  0.39  0.06  0.06  0.07  -0.024  -0.016  0.10  0.03  0.03  0.13 
Spain  693  0.16  0.08  0.42  0.07  0.07  0.07  -0.015  -0.011  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.08 
Sweden  724  0.02  -0.01  0.46  0.03  0.05  0.15  0.017  0.001  0.09  0.04  0.06  0.15 
UK  5077  0.11  0.05  0.50  0.04  0.06  0.11  0.008  -0.001  0.09  0.05  0.06  0.14 
EU  13239  0.09  0.03  0.48  0.05  0.06  0.11  -0.003  -0.004  0.08  0.04  0.05  0.13 
Notes:   The sample consist of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have GLOBAL Vantage active/industrial research file data needed to calculate returns, net income, and dirty surplus flows and the 
market value of shareholders’ equity deflated net income, clean surplus income, and dirty surplus flows are required to be in the range of –1 and 1. This study is limited to non-financial European 
firms with consolidated financial statements that are prepared under local GAAP and are reported consistent fiscal year. Their market capitalization should be larger than 1 million Euros and the 
shareholders’ equity record a positive number. Observations fall into the top or bottom one percent at each tail of concerned variables are identified as outliers and are excluded.  
Variable definitions: R: contemporary stock returns accumulated over 12-month period; NI: reported net income; DS: dirty surplus accounting flows, NICL: pro-forma clean surplus 
income calculated as described in session 3, and all accounting variables are deflated by market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.    53 
The clean surplus income seems to be less persistent than the reported income and this 
result is consistent with previous literature (Ali and Zarowin 1992, Barth et al. 1992, 
Stark 1997, Ohlson 1999, and Burgstahler et al. 2002), which suggests that investors tend 
to discount more transitory accounting information at a lower rate.  
 
TABLE 3.3: Results of robust OLS regression models of the associations between returns 
and net income, dirty surplus flows, and clean surplus income  
 
M1  M2  Model Selection  M3 
Number of 
firm-year 
observations Adj. R  NI  Adj. R  NICL  J(M1)  J(M2)  Adj. R  NI  DS 
Austria  154  0.01  0.13  0.01  0.13  0.08  0.04  0.01  0.16  0.11 
      (0.12)    (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.10)    (0.12)  (0.11) 
Belgium  359  0.15  1.53  0.11  1.34  0.14  0.96  0.15  1.56  0.20 
      (0.21)***   (0.27)*** (0.42)  (0.34)***   (0.25)*** (0.58) 
Denmark  468  0.09  0.95  0.08  0.85  0.32  0.43  0.10  1.05  0.43 
      (0.16)***   (0.13)*** (0.12)*** (0.14)***   (0.16)*** (0.16)*** 
Finland  400  0.18  1.68  0.15  1.29  0.38  0.86  0.19  1.74  0.52 
      (0.26)***   (0.15)*** (0.15)**  (0.25)***   (0.24)*** (0.20)** 
France  2109  0.15  1.62  0.10  1.23  -0.11  1.23  0.15  1.61  -0.15 
      (0.11)***   (0.09)*** (0.09)  (0.11)***   (0.11)*** (0.13) 
Germany  1312  0.10  0.88  0.07  0.72  -0.01  0.62  0.10  0.87  -0.02 
      (0.09)***   (0.08)*** (0.09)  (0.09)***   (0.09)*** (0.12) 
Greece  235  0.18  11.1  0.10  6.88  2.11  6.56  0.19  12.25  2.88 
      (1.52)***   (1.30)*** (1.08)*  (1.23)***   (1.68)*** (1.48)* 
Ireland  202  0.14  1.97  0.01  0.32  -0.61  1.84  0.17  1.81  -0.83 
      (0.52)***   (0.36)*** (0.30)**  (0.38)***   (0.51)*** (0.40)** 
Italy  555  0.15  1.94  0.07  1.10  -0.02  1.38  0.16  1.94  -0.03 
      (0.28)***   (0.23)*** (0.17)  (0.22)***   (0.29)*** -0.24 
Netherlands 776  0.10  1.11  0.06  0.76  -0.13  0.88  0.10  1.08  -0.18 
      (0.18)***   (0.14)*** (0.15)  (0.19)***   (0.18)*** (0.20) 
Portugal  175  0.14  2.02  0.10  0.95  0.31  1.10  0.15  1.99  0.43 
      (0.51)***   (0.27)*** (0.20)  (0.35)***   (0.51)*** (0.28) 
Spain  693  0.10  1.90  0.04  1.00  -0.24  1.53  0.10  1.86  -0.33 
      (0.32)***   (0.20)*** (0.19)  (0.30)***   (0.32)*** (0.26) 
Sweden  724  0.21  1.43  0.20  1.36  0.48  0.62  0.23  1.54  0.66 
      (0.12)***   (0.12)*** (0.13)*** (0.13)***   (0.13)*** (0.18)*** 
UK  5077  0.11  1.54  0.09  1.14  0.35  0.77  0.12  1.58  0.48 
      (0.08)***   (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)***   (0.08)*** (0.08)*** 
EU  13239 0.11  1.45  0.08  1.08  0.27  0.83  0.11  1.48  0.29 
      (0.04)***   (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.04)***   (0.04)*** (0.05)*** 
Notes:   The sample consist of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have GLOBAL Vantage active/industrial research 
file data needed to calculate returns, net income, and dirty surplus flows and the market value of shareholders’ 
equity deflated net income, clean surplus income, and dirty surplus flows are required to be in the range of –1 and 
1. This study is limited to non-financial European firms with consolidated financial statements that are prepared    54 
The non-nested J test suggests that reported income dominants clean surplus income as 
explanatory  variables  for  returns  in  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain. However, clean surplus income is informative in the presence of 
reported income in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK.  
 
The incremental value-relevance study shows a similar pattern. Dirty surplus flows are 
incrementally relevant at less than 5% significance level in 5 countries only: Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK. Overall, dirty surplus flows are more transitory 
than  other  components  of  earnings  and  most  returns-net  income-dirty  surplus  flows 
models show no improvement over conventional returns-net income model.  
 
3.4.2.2 Results of the association with future income or future operating income 
Table 3.4 provides summary statistics of the variables used to forecast net income. The 
mean and the median of later period net income is always lower or equal to the current 
net income, which suggests that firms’ profitability is decreasing in the sampling period in 
EU states (1993-2002). The mean of reported accounting information is very close across 
EU member states: the reported income ranges from 2% to 8% of market value of 
shareholfer’s equity, the dirty surplus flows are from –3.3% to 1.5% and the clean surplus 
income are from 2% to 9%.  
Notes to table 3.3 (continued): 
under local GAAP and are reported consistent fiscal year. Their market capitalization should be larger than 1 
million Euros and the shareholders’ equity record a positive number. Observations fall into the top or bottom 
one percent at each tail of concerned variables are identified as outliers and are excluded.  
Variable definitions: R: contemporary stock returns accumulated over 12-month period; NI: reported 
net income; DS: dirty surplus accounting flows, NICL: pro-forma clean surplus income calculated as described in 
session 3, and all accounting variables are deflated by market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of the 
fiscal year.  
The panels labeled M1, M2, and M3 report the estimated coefficients and the test statistics of the 
respective models. The sub-columns label the variables’ names report the results of the relevant variables. Adj. R.: 
adjusted R-squares of the estimated models. J(M1)/J(M2) records the non-nested J-test assuming that M1/M2 is 
the true model and it reports the coefficients of the predicted value from M2/M1 in the artificial nesting model. 
Huber-Whites robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 
5% level, and * significant at 10% level.  
Models: M1: 1 1 0 e NI a a R + + = ; M2: 2 1 0 e NICL a a R + ′ + ′ = ; M3:  3 2 1 0 e DS a NI a a R ′ ′ + ′ ′ + ′ ′ + ′ ′ =    55 
TABLE3.4: Summary statistics of the variables used to forecast net income with current net income, dirty surplus flows, and clean surplus income  
 
NIF  NI  DS  NICL  Number of firm-year 
observations  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std. 
Austria  129  0.04  0.06  0.15  0.06  0.06  0.12  -0.002  0.000  0.13  0.05  0.05  0.15 
Belgium  283  0.06  0.06  0.09  0.06  0.06  0.08  -0.022  -0.016  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.07 
Denmark  377  0.06  0.06  0.13  0.07  0.07  0.10  -0.005  -0.001  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.10 
Finland  315  0.07  0.07  0.11  0.08  0.08  0.10  0.009  -0.002  0.09  0.09  0.07  0.13 
France  1653  0.04  0.05  0.11  0.05  0.06  0.09  -0.020  -0.012  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.10 
Germany  1081  0.02  0.04  0.14  0.04  0.04  0.10  0.000  0.000  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.10 
Greece  182  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.05  -0.033  -0.018  0.06  0.02  0.02  0.06 
Ireland  173  0.07  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.09  -0.005  -0.001  0.10  0.07  0.08  0.13 
Italy  435  0.03  0.04  0.09  0.04  0.04  0.08  0.006  -0.001  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.10 
Netherlands  661  0.06  0.07        0.10  0.07  0.08  0.08  -0.026  -0.009  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.10 
Portugal  133  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.07  -0.026  -0.013  0.09  0.03  0.03  0.11 
Spain  587  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.06  -0.012  -0.008  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.08 
Sweden  532  0.04  0.06  0.15  0.06  0.07  0.11  0.015  0.002  0.09  0.07  0.07  0.12 
UK  4249  0.04  0.06  0.12  0.06  0.07  0.09  0.011  0.000  0.09  0.07  0.06  0.12 
EU  10795  0.04  0.06  0.12  0.06  0.06  0.09  -0.002  -0.003  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.11 
Notes:   The sample consist of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have GLOBAL Vantage active/industrial research file data needed to calculate returns, net income, and dirty surplus 
flows and the market value of shareholders’ equity deflated net income, clean surplus income, and dirty surplus flows are required to be in the range of –1 and 1. This study is 
limited  to  non-financial  European  firms  with  consolidated  financial  statements  that  are  prepared  under  local  GAAP  and  are  reported  consistent  fiscal  year.  Their  market 
capitalization should be larger than 1 million Euros and the shareholders’ equity record a positive number. Observations fall into the top or bottom one percent at each tail of 
concerned variables are identified as outliers and are excluded.  
Variable definitions: NIF: reported net income in the leading period; NI: reported net income; DS: dirty surplus accounting flows, NICL: pro-forma clean surplus 
income calculated as described in session 3, and all accounting variables are deflated by market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.   56 
TABLE  3.5:  Results  of  robust  OLS  regression  models  forecasting  net  incomes  with 
current net income, dirty surplus flows, and clean surplus income 
 
M4  M5  Model Selection  M6  Number of 
firm-year 
observations 
Adj. R  NI  Adj. R  NICL  J(M4)  J(M5)  Adj. R  NI  DS 
Austria  129 0.10  0.38  0.03  0.19  0.02  0.57  0.10  0.39  0.01 
      (0.16)**    (0.08)**  (0.15)  (0.25)**    (0.16)**  (0.06) 
Belgium  283 0.10  0.37   0.14  0.45  0.92  0.15  0.14  0.47  0.37 
      (0.10)***   (0.11)*** (0.36)  (0.20)    (0.11)*** (0.15)** 
Denmark  377 0.20  0.62  0.13  0.49  0.14  0.87  0.20  0.63  0.06 
      (0.10)***   (0.08)*** (0.30)  (0.24)***   (0.10)*** (0.12) 
Finland  315 0.21  0.51  0.11  0.28  0.00  0.78  0.21  0.51  0.00 
      (0.09)***   (0.06)*** (0.22)  (0.22)***   (0.09)*** (0.09) 
France  1653 0.20  0.59  0.14  0.43  0.03  0.88  0.20  0.59  0.01 
      (0.05)***   (0.04)*** (0.11)  (0.10)***   (0.05)*** (0.05) 
Germany  1081 0.22  0.63  0.16  0.54  0.20  0.86  0.22  0.64  0.08 
      (0.06)***   (0.06)*** (0.25)  (0.17)***   (0.06)*** (0.10) 
Greece  182 0.21  0.45  0.02  0.12  -0.15  0.74  0.22  0.42  -0.06 
      (0.07)***   (0.08)  (0.19)  (0.11)***   (0.08)*** (0.08) 
Ireland  173 0.32  0.57  0.21  0.33  0.27  0.72  0.34  0.58  0.11 
      (0.09)***   (0.07)*** (0.18)  (0.14)***   (0.09)*** (0.07) 
Italy  435 0.32  0.60  0.14  0.32  -0.23  1.04  0.32  0.59  -0.09 
     (0.07)***   (0.06)*** (0.15)  (0.13)***   (0.07)*** (0.06) 
Netherlands  661 0.14  0.45  0.06  0.26  -0.14  0.75  0.14  0.44  -0.06 
      (0.07)***   (0.05)*** (0.12)  (0.12)***   (0.07)*** (0.05) 
Portugal  133 0.14  0.33  0.10  0.18  0.22  0.38  0.15  0.34  0.09 
      (0.12)***   (0.05)*** (0.14)  (0.21)*    (0.12)*** (0.06) 
Spain  587 0.16  0.43  0.08  0.24  0.06  0.62  0.16  0.43  0.02 
      (0.05)***   (0.04)*** (0.14)  (0.12)***   (0.06)*** (0.06) 
Sweden  532 0.26  0.66  0.11  0.41  -0.21  1.09  0.26  0.64  -0.08 
      (0.09)***   (0.08)*** (0.23)  (0.18)***   (0.09)*** (0.09) 
UK  4249 0.16  0.54  0.07  0.26  -0.10  0.87  0.16  0.53  -0.04 
      (0.03)***   (0.02)*** (0.06)* (0.06)***   (0.03)*** (0.02)* 
EU  10790 0.19  0.56  0.09  0.32  -0.08  1.04  0.19  0.56  -0.02 
      (0.02)***   (0.01)*** (0.05)  (0.05)***   (0.02)*** (0.02) 
Notes:   The sample consist of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have GLOBAL Vantage active/industrial research 
file data needed to calculate returns, net income, and dirty surplus flows and the market value of shareholders’ 
equity deflated net income, clean surplus income, and dirty surplus flows are required to be in the range of –1 
and 1. This study is limited to non-financial European firms with consolidated financial statements that are 
prepared under local GAAP and are reported consistent fiscal year. Their market capitalization should be larger 
than 1 million Euros and the shareholders’ equity record a positive number. Observations fall into the top or 
bottom one percent at each tail of concerned variables are identified as outliers and are excluded.  
Variable definitions: NIF: reported net income in the leading period; NI: reported net income; DS: 
dirty surplus accounting flows, NICL: pro-forma clean surplus income calculated as described in session 3, and 
all accounting variables are deflated by market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
The panels labeled M4, M5, and M6 report the estimated coefficients and the test statistics of the 
respective models. The sub-columns label the variables’ names report the results of the relevant variables. Adj. 
R.:  adjusted  R-squares  of  the  estimated  models.  J(M4)/J(M5)  records  the  non-nested  J-test  assuming  that 
M4/M5 is the true model and it reports the coefficients of the predicted value from M5/M4 in the artificial 
nesting model. Huber-Whites robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, 
** significant at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level.    57 
Table 3.5 shows that current net income and clean surplus income are able to predict 
future net income in all 14 EU countries at less than 5% significance level, except that 
the clean surplus income is irrelevant in Greece. 
 
Overall, the coefficients of reported income is from 0.33 the lowest (Portugal) to 0.66 the 
highest (Sweden). In most cases, net income is more persistent than the clean surplus 
income and the non-nested J test confirms that net income always outperforms clean 
surplus income in predicting future firm performance, except in Belgium. Dirty surplus 
flows are relevant in predicting future net income in Belgium at 5% significance level and 
in UK at 10% significance level. In sum, neither clean surplus income nor dirty surplus 
flows is good predictor of future net income.  
 
Table 3.6 presents the summary statistics of variables used to forecast operating income 
growth.  Operating  income  growth  varies  little  across  EU  countries.  It  is  normally 
between –1% and 2% of market value of shareholders’ equity. The market to book ratio, 
which is the proxy for growth opportunities, ranges from 1.44 in Austria to 3.93 in 
Greece on average. It seems that the Greek (3.93), Dutch (3.32), and British (3.14) firms 
enjoy more growth opportunities in comparison to other EU countries. The evidence 
suggests that the Spanish and the Italian firms employ larger amount of assets, 6.36 and 
6.35  million  Euros  respectively.  The  Greek  firms  are  closer  in  terms  of  firm  size 
(standard deviation 0.84) and the Dutch firms exhibit most variations (standard deviation 
1.82).    
 
Notes to table 3.5 (continued): 
Models: M4: 4 1 0 e NI a a NIF + + = ; M5: 5 1 0 e NICL a a NIF ′ + ′ + ′ = ; M6:  6 2 1 0 e DS a NI a a NIF ′ ′ + ′ ′ + ′ ′ + ′ ′ =    58 
TABLE 3.6: Summary statistics of variables used to forecast operating income growth with current dirty surplus flows, operating income growth, 
market to book ratio, and total asset 
 
NIOPF  DS  NIOP  MB  AT  Number of firm-year 
observations  Mean Median  Std.  Mean Median  Std.  Mean Median  Std.  Mean Median  Std.  Mean Median  Std. 
Austria  133  -0.01  0.01  0.15  -0.006  -0.002  0.14  0.02  0.01  0.13  1.44  1.19  1.03  5.21  4.80  1.36 
Belgium  280  0.01  0.00  0.07  -0.022  -0.016  0.05  0.01  0.01  0.06  2.23  1.60  1.98  5.81  5.64  1.63 
Denmark  390  0.00  0.01  0.10  -0.004  -0.002  0.08  0.01  0.01  0.10  2.53  1.24  3.95  5.27  5.41  1.33 
Finland  328  0.01  0.01  0.11  0.009  -0.002  0.09  0.02  0.01  0.11  1.94  1.51  1.60  5.88  5.93  1.47 
France  1720  0.01  0.01  0.09  -0.020  -0.013  0.06  0.01  0.01  0.08  2.47  1.68  2.51  5.54  5.33  1.77 
Germany  1127  0.00  0.00  0.13  0.000  0.000  0.07  0.01  0.00  0.13  2.70  1.89  3.81  5.51  5.48  1.42 
Greece  181  0.01  0.00  0.04  -0.036  -0.020  0.05  0.01  0.00  0.03  3.93  2.87  3.03  5.46  5.48  0.84 
Ireland  175  0.02  0.02  0.01  -0.001  -0.001  0.09  0.02  0.02  0.06  2.52  1.83  2.39  5.14  5.29  1.61 
Italy  421  0.01  0.01  0.08  0.006  -0.001  0.07  0.01  0.01  0.07  2.25  1.55  2.12  6.35  6.06  1.67 
Netherlands  657  0.01  0.02  0.07  -0.028  -0.009  0.07  0.01  0.02  0.06  3.32  2.02  3.86  5.80  5.74  1.82 
Portugal  130  0.02  0.01  0.09  -0.024  -0.013  0.09  0.02  0.02  0.08  1.76  1.48  1.23  6.00  5.95  1.52 
Spain  567  0.02  0.01  0.08  -0.011  -0.008  0.06  0.02  0.01  0.07  2.02  1.54  1.73  6.36  6.02  1.57 
Sweden  588  0.01  0.01  0.13  0.016  0.001  0.09  0.01  0.01  0.13  2.47  1.78  2.12  5.52 5.32  1.81 
UK  4384  0.01  0.01  0.09  0.012  0.000  0.09  0.01  0.01  0.08  3.14  2.02  3.64  5.32  5.10  1.74 
EU  11081  0.01  0.01  0.10  -0.001  -0.003  0.08  0.01  0.01  0.09  2.76  1.79  3.21  5.54  5.40  1.70 
Notes:   The sample consist of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have GLOBAL Vantage active/industrial research file data needed to calculate returns, net income, and dirty surplus 
flows and the market value of shareholders’ equity deflated net income, clean surplus income, and dirty surplus flows are required to be in the range of –1 and 1. This study is 
limited  to  non-financial  European  firms  with  consolidated  financial  statements  that  are  prepared  under  local  GAAP  and  are  reported  consistent  fiscal  year.  Their  market 
capitalization should be larger than 1 million Euros and the shareholders’ equity record a positive number. Observations fall into the top or bottom one percent at each tail of 
concerned variables are identified as outliers and are excluded.  
Variable definitions: NIOPF: operating income growth in the immediate leading period; NIOP: operating income growth; DS: dirty surplus accounting flows, MB: 
market to book ratio, AT: the natural log of total assets and all accounting variables are deflated by market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of the fiscal year except 
MB and AT.   59 
TABLE 3.7: Results of fixed-effect panel models that test the predictability of dirty surplus flows with one (two)-period ahead operating income 
 
M7  M8  Number of firm-year 
observations  Adj. R  DS  OPCH  MB  ATLOG  N  Adj. R  DS  OPCH  MB  ATLOG 
Austria  133 0.12  -0.08  0.09  -0.02  -0.21  112 0.31  0.07  -0.35  -0.03  -0.31 
      (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.02)  (0.07)***      (0.10)  (0.10)***  (0.02)  (0.06)*** 
Belgium  280 0.04  0.17  -0.15  0.00  -0.02  226 0.06  0.01  -0.26  0.00  -0.08 
      (0.10)*  (0.08)*  (0.00)  (0.02)      (0.18)  (0.15)*  (0.01)  (0.03)*** 
Denmark  390 0.12  0.18  -0.27  0.00  -0.08  324 0.16  0.23  -0.50  -0.01  -0.12 
      (0.07)**  ((0.06)***  (0.00)  (0.02)***      (0.10)**  (0.09)***  0.00  (0.03)*** 
Finland  328 0.16  0.21  -0.30  0.00  -0.10  253 0.22  0.10  -0.41  -0.01  -0.22 
      (0.07)***  (0.07)***  (0.01)  (0.02)***      (0.09)  (0.10)***  (0.01)  (0.04)*** 
France  1720 0.04  0.01  -0.13  0.00  -0.03  1312 0.11  0.03  -0.38  -0.01  -0.07 
      (0.04)  (0.03)***  (0.00)**  (0.01)***      (0.06)  (0.04)***  (0.00)**  (0.01)*** 
Germany  1127 0.11  0.41  -0.24  0.00  -0.06  946 0.08  0.38  -0.29  0.00  -0.06 
      (0.06)***  (0.03)***  (0.00)*  (0.01)***      (0.09)***  (0.05)***  (0.00)  (0.02)** 
Greece  181 0.10  0.12  -0.22  0.00  -0.03  130 0.30  0.30  -0.72  0.00  -0.06 
      (0.09)  (0.13)*  (0.00)   (0.01)***      (0.14)**  (0.18)***  (0.00)   (0.01)*** 
Ireland  175 0.14  0.03  -0.33  0.00  -0.03  151 0.21  -0.04  -0.26  -0.01  -0.09 
      (0.07)  (0.09)***  (0.00)   (0.01)**      (0.10)  (0.15)*  (0.00)*  (0.02)*** 
Italy  421 0.08  0.16  -0.21  0.00  -0.04  322 0.16  0.34  -0.53  -0.01  -0.10 
     (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.00)   (0.02)**      (0.11)***  (0.10)***  (0.01)  (0.03)*** 
Netherlands  657 0.07  0.04  -0.08  0.00  -0.04  553 0.15  0.02  -0.28  0.00  -0.09 
      (0.05)  (0.05)*  (0.00)   (0.01)***      (0.07)  (0.08)***  (0.00)   (0.01)*** 
Portugal  130 0.06  -0.05  -0.22  -0.01  -0.03  105 0.17  -0.04  -0.51  -0.04  0.00 
      (0.10)  (0.12)*  (0.02)  (0.03)      (0.16)  (0.17)***  (0.02)*  (0.05) 
Spain  567 0.07  0.10  -0.10  0.01  -0.04  479 0.11  0.15  -0.11  0.01  -0.08 
      (0.07)  (0.05)**  (0.00)***  (0.01)***      (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.01)  (0.01)*** 
Sweden  588 0.11  0.19  -0.27  0.00  -0.09  420 0.17  0.15  -0.57  -0.02  -0.11   60 
      (0.08)**  (0.05)***  (0.01)  (0.02)***      (0.14)  (0.09)***  (0.01)**  (0.03)*** 
UK  4384 0.07  0.02  -0.20  0.00  -0.04  3642 0.15  0.03  -0.35  0.00  -0.09 
      (0.02)  (0.02)***  (0.00)   (0.00)***      (0.02)  (0.03)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
EU  11081 0.07  0.08  -0.20  0.00  -0.05  8975 0.12  0.09  -0.35  0.00  -0.09 
      (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.00)  (0.00)***      (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
Notes:   The sample consist of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have GLOBAL Vantage active/industrial research file data needed to calculate returns, net income, and dirty surplus 
flows and the market value of shareholders’ equity deflated net income, clean surplus income, and dirty surplus flows are required to be in the range of –1 and 1. This study is limited 
to non-financial European firms with consolidated financial statements that are prepared under local GAAP and are reported consistent fiscal year. Their market capitalization 
should be larger than 1 million Euros and the shareholders’ equity record a positive number. Observations fall into the top or bottom one percent at each tail of concerned variables 
are identified as outliers and are excluded.  
Variable definitions: NIOPFF: operating income growth in the period leading for two years; NIOPF: operating income growth in the immediate leading period; NIOP: 
operating income growth; DS: dirty surplus accounting flows, MB: market to book ratio; AT: the natural log of total assets and all accounting variables are deflated by market value 
of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of the fiscal year except MB and AT. 
The panels labeled M7 and M8 report the estimated coefficients and the test statistics of the respective models. The sub-columns label the variables’ names report the 
results of the relevant variables. Adj. R.: adjusted R-squares of the estimated models. The fixed effects are estimated alone both the year and the firm dimensions and the standard 
errors are reported in the parentheses. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, and * significant at 10% level.  
Models: M7:
7 4 3 2 1 0 e AT b MB b DS b NIOP b b NIOPF + + + + + = ; M8:
8 0 4 3 2 1 e AT b MB b DS b NIOP b b NIOPF + ′ + ′ + ′ + ′ + ′ =    61
Table  3.7  shows  the  results  of  fixed-effect  panel  models  that  test  the  predictability  of  dirty 
surplus flows with respect to one (two)-period ahead operating income growth. Dirty surplus 
flows  are  significant  in  explaining  one  and  two  period  ahead  operating  income  growth  in 
Denmark, Germany, and Italy at less than 5% level, and moreover they are able to explain one 
period ahead operating income growth in Finland and Sweden.   
 
Concurrent operating income growth is negatively related to future operating income growth 
with Austria and Spain as exceptions. The market to book ratio does not seem to be able to 
predict future firm operating performance, but assets are useful in most countries. 
 
3.4.3  Robustness tests 
I report results based on contemporaneous returns. However, it is observed that most financial 
reports are made public 6 month after fiscal year end. An additional return measure lagged for six 
month after fiscal year end are used for the robustness check of potential timing differences 
between accounting and stock market information. 
 
I also test the robustness of the models by taking into account the following four criterions: 
adjusting for the existence of treasury stock, the occurrence of mergers and acquisitions, and the 
active status of firms, and the consistent presentation of balance sheet.  
 
It is difficult to distinguish the impact of the capital repurchases on the capital account and the 
reserve account when firms repurchase their stock. During a period of mergers and acquisitions, 
stock for stock transaction may take place and it is not clear how each account is accounted for 
unless one reads the footnote about the mergers and acquisitions. Dead and de-listed firms may 
record  extraordinary  account  at  the  time  financial  distress  occurs,  and  hence,  their  financial 
statement may not be representative at such times.     62
Finally, since Global Vantage does not have indicator for firms’ choice of profit appropriation 
status,  I  regards  the  existence  of  an  un-appropriated  account  as  a  proxy  for  the  profit 
appropriation status. To be cautious on this issue and to check the validity of this indicator 
variable, I check the results with firms using consistent profit appropriation account during the 
period studied.  
 
I re-run all models after excluding firms that have treasury stocks in the shareholders’ equity 
session; firms that experienced major merger and acquisition; dead and de-listed firms; and firms 
report inconsistent profit appropriation status. The main conclusions are not altered with these 
robustness tests.     
 
3.5  Conclusions 
Dirty  surplus  flows  contain  performance-decreasing  information  in  majority  of  EU  member 
states. They are economically significant in magnitude in comparison to net income. This partly 
explains the standard setters’ intention to eliminate dirty surplus flows in EU member states.  
 
Both GAAP net income and clean surplus income are significant in explaining returns in 13 
European countries under investigation, although investors discount clean surplus income at a 
lower rate. Hence, the net income is the preferred explanatory variable for returns.   
 
Dirty  surplus  flows  are  significant  in  explaining  returns  in  the  presence  of  net  income  in 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK. However, the returns-earnings-dirty surplus 
flows model shows no obvious improvements over conventional returns-earnings models. Dirty 
surplus flows seem more transitory than other components of reported income, as they have a 
lower coefficient than net income. Dirty surplus flows are also able to predict future net income 
and firm (operating) performance at times.    63
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APPENDIX 3.1 
Adjustments for profits appropriation statues are made to reflect the timing of the dividends 
payments. For example, if current shareholders’ equity is reported after profits appropriation 
(excluding dividends), we add back current period dividends to clean surplus net income; and if 
previous period shareholders’ equity is reported after profits appropriation (excluding dividends 
in period t-1), then we add back previous period dividends. On the contrary, we do not add back 
dividends  of  the  period  when  firms  choose  to  report  pre-profits  appropriation  shareholders’ 
equity. 
 
As an alternative, we define clean surplus earnings as follows: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i ERO CURDIF RVLRV UNNP DVT RE NICL , . . , , , , ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ =   
If  t UNNPD = 0 &  t UNNPLD  = 0 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i ERO CURDIF RVLRV UNNP DVT RE NICL , . . , 1 , , , ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ = −  
If  t UNNPD  = 1 &  t UNNPLD  = 1 
t i t i t i t i t i t i ERO CURDIF RVLRV UNNP RE NICL , . . , , , ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ =  
If  t UNNPD  =1 &  t UNNPLD  = 0 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i CURDIF RVLRV ERO UNNP DVT DVT RE NICL . . , , . 1 , , , ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + + ∆ = −  
If  t UNNPD = 0 &  t UNNPLD  = 1 
 
Where: 
t i NICL ,  = Clean surplus earnings of company i in period t; 
t i RE , ∆  (RE G182) = Changes of retained earnings of company i in period t; 
t i DVT .  (DVT G425) = Total dividends of company i in period t; 
t i UNNP, ∆  (UNNP G273) = Changes of Un-appropriated net profits
36 (shareholders’ equity session) of 
company i in period t; 
t i ERO , ∆  (ERO G653) = Changes of equity reserves_other of company i in period t; 
t i RVLRV . ∆  (RVLRV G652) = Changes of revaluation reserves of company i in period t; 
t i CURDIF. ∆ (TRANSA G192) = Changes of currency translation differences of company i in period t; 
t UNNPD  = A dummy variable, which denotes 1 if un-appropriated profits in period t is not equal to 0, 0 
otherwise; 
t UNNPLD  = A dummy variable, which denotes 1 if un-appropriated profits in period t-1 is not equal to 0, 0 
otherwise.  
                                                            
36 It is also possible that un-appropriated profits (losses) are transferred out of shareholders’ equity session. In this 
case, we should also add back ‘Changes of Un-appropriated net profits/losses in the liability session/asset session)’ in theory. 
However, these two sessions in GV contain only 0 in practice, therefore, I skip them in the calculations.    67
 
Chapter 4  
International Differences in the Conservatism of  
Clean Surplus Accounting Earnings
37 
 
4.1  Introduction 
We examine differences in the asymmetric timeliness of income recognition, a measure of “news-
related conservatism” [NRC] in earnings, between 14 EU member states. Specifically, we contrast 
the NRC in clean surplus income with that in net income and show that clean surplus income is 
generally less conservative than net income. Clean surplus income is defined as net income plus 
all changes in equity (not in earnings) except those resulting from investments by the owners and 
distributions to the owners. Non-earnings changes in equity are commonly referred to as dirty 
surplus flows. Clean surplus income is purported to be a superior summary measure of firm 
performance (Dhaliwal et al. 1999, and American Accounting Association Financial Accounting 
Standards Committee 1997) and seems to be preferred by accounting regulators.  
  
We exploit the fact that net income, not clean surplus income, is used in the firm as a mechanism 
to  disclose  information  to  outside  parties  for  evidence  on  the  importance  of  contracting 
explanations for the existence of accounting conservatism (Watts 2003 a, and b). Since clean 
surplus income is generally less conservative than net income, we provide support for the idea 
that contracting is a significant explanation of NRC in net income. At the very least, our results 
show that NRC in net income is forged for a significant part through dirty surplus flows. 
 
Consistent with this explanation we also find that the cross-country variance of NRC is smaller 
when measured in clean surplus income than when measured using net income. In other words,   68
countries appear to be more similar with respect to news related conservatism in earnings when 
earnings are adjusted for dirty surplus flows. It seems that contracting mechanism is an important 
explanation for cross country difference in accounting conservatism.  
 
We also document differences between the 14 EU member states in a firm’s tendency to choose 
accounting methods that lead to lower reported values for earnings.  We refer to this tendency as 
‘news  unrelated  conservatism’  [NUC]  and  measure  it  as  the  downward  bias  in  clean  surplus 
income and in net income. If earnings are used for distribution, then management has incentives 
to keep reported earnings low and will charge all costs to earnings and not to equity (that is, they 
will  not  use  dirty  surplus  flows).  Since  management  does  not  use  dirty  surplus  flows,  clean 
surplus income and net income will be of similar magnitude.   
 
If earnings are not used for distribution, management will have incentives to increase reported 
earnings and charging part of the costs to equity (dirty surplus) is one way to increase net income.  
We find support for our hypothesis that NUC differs predictably between those EU member 
states where net income is used to distribute earnings to stakeholders and those states where 
earnings are used less for this purpose. While these dirty surplus flows will reduce reported net 
income, clean surplus income is relatively unaffected and should show less bias.   
 
This  chapter  extends  research  on  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  and  shows  that  the 
earnings definition (clean surplus income v. net income) matters when measuring timeliness. This 
finding is related to the evidence in Pope and Walker (1999) who show that ordinary income in 
the UK is much less conservative than income after extraordinary items. They conclude that 
much  of  the  recognition  of  bad  news  is  through  extraordinary  items.  We  believe  that  their 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
37 This chapter is based on an updated version of a paper presented at the 2004 EAA Annual Congress in Prague 
(Wang and Buijink 2004). The authors wish to thank congress participants, Margaret Abernethy, Peter Easton, 
Patrick McColgan and seminar participants at Tilburg University for their constructive comments.    69
conclusion has wider implications and show that bad news is also recognized via dirty surplus 
items. In addition, we extend prior work on news unrelated conservatism (Joos and Lang 1994) 
and suggest that cross EU differences in this type of conservatism are consistent with the role of 
earnings in the distribution of wealth created in the firm (Ball et al. 2000).    
 
Our sample consists of non-financial firms listed and domiciled in the 14 EU member states (we 
excluded Luxembourg) in 1993-2002. This sample allows for a broad-based investigation into the 
timeliness of clean surplus income and net income in the EU; it also allows us to report on the 
magnitude  of  dirty  surplus  flows  in  the  EU,  which  has  been  a  topic  of  considerable  recent 
controversy among EU regulators.   
 
We proceed as follows. First, we summarize the literature on news related and news unrelated 
conservatism.  We  next  relate  conservatism  to  dirty  surplus  flows  and  clean  surplus  income. 
Section 3 describes the sample selection and discusses the models we estimate. The results are in 
Section 4 and we conclude the chapter in Section 5. 
 
4.2  Hypotheses development 
In  this  section  we  summarize  theory  on  news  related  and  news  unrelated  conservatism  in 
accounting earnings. We then survey empirical work that relates differences in conservatism to 
(1)  differences  in  institutional  settings  between  countries  and  (2)  to  the  specific  earnings 
definition that is used in the investigation. Building on this earlier work, we then discuss our 
predictions on both types of conservatism in net income and clean surplus income. 
 
4.2.1 A theory of conservative accounting 
The literature on conservatism in accounting may be separated into two broad views.  One view 
focuses on verification requirements that are said to differ between accounting gains and losses   70
(Watts 2003 a, and b). Conservatism then implies that high verification requirements are applied 
for recognizing gains as earnings, while losses have to satisfy only modest verification and are 
recognized as soon as they occur. The outcome of these differential verification requirements is 
that earnings will reflect losses sooner than gains, and thus that earnings exhibit asymmetry in 
their timeliness of incorporation of losses and gains. Since information about losses and gains is 
news,  this  type  of  conservatism  may  be  referred  to  as  news-related  conservatism  [NRC]. 
Although several competing explanations for NRC exist, it appears that contracting explanations 
have garnered most support (Watts 2003 a, and b, and Basu 1997). The contracting explanation 
views conservatism as an efficient contracting mechanism because ‘it is optimal for contracts’ 
performance measures to have more stringent verification standards for gains than for losses’ 
(Watts 2003 a, 214). Conservatism puts bounds on the opportunity self-interested managers have 
to overstate net assets and earnings. Debt holders and shareholders, who are at arm’s length, are 
likely to favor such restriction since it reduces the likelihood that the value of their claim on the 
company is reduced.   
 
The alternative view holds that conservatism is about the measurement of profits. Relatively low 
reported profits (compared to some unobservable ‘true income’) are then viewed as conservative 
(Giner and Rees 2001, Joos and Lang 1994). We refer to this type of conservatism as news 
unrelated conservatism [NUC]. The literature has offered several explanations for NUC, which 
concentrate  on  the  reduction  of  stakeholders’  claims  on  earnings  in  those  institutional 
environments where earnings are used to distribute wealth among stakeholders. For example, if 
taxes are based on reported accounting earnings, management will have strong incentives to keep 
net income low to ensure that payments to government do not become excessive. Similarly, if 
dividends payable to shareholders are by law or in practice closely linked to reported income, 
management  again  may  have  incentives  to  keep  net  income  low  to  ward  off  excessive   71
distributions. Clearly, the extent of NUC in earnings is determined by the role earnings play in 
the institutional setting of the firm.  
 
In sum, two distinct views on conservatism have emerged in literature.  Their implications for net 
income are quite different. NRC predicts asymmetric timeliness of incorporating good versus bad 
news, while NUC expects a downward bias in net income (i.e., net income will be depressed 
relative to ‘true income’). 
 
4.2.2 Empirical work on international differences in conservatism 
While both NRC and NUC are hypothesized to be fairly universal characteristics of accounting 
earnings,  the  degree  of  conservatism  in  earnings  is  likely  to  be  contingent  on  the  specific 
institutional  and  contractual  circumstances  a  firm  faces.  International  studies  then  provide  a 
natural setting to explore the influence of institutions on conservatism, exploiting the institutional 
diversity across countries. For example, Ball et al. (2000) group countries into common law and 
code law legal regimes and investigate their influence on NRC. Ball et al. (2003) document that 
preparers’ incentives for reporting may be more influenced by political and economic influences 
than  by  accounting  standards  in  the  absence  of  strong  enforcement  mechanisms.  Basu  (1997) 
considers the strict liability regime in the US as a partial explanation for the high degree of NRC 
in this country. Together these studies suggest that earnings in common law countries will exhibit 
more NRC than in code law countries. The explanation is that in common law countries the role 
of earnings is mostly to disclose private information to relatively uninformed outsiders. These 
outsiders have asymmetric loss functions and care about being informed in time about losses 
more than being informed about gains.   
 
In  code  law  regimes,  earnings’  role  is  to  distribute  the  wealth  earned  in  a  company  among 
stakeholders.  A  prime  consideration  is  that  these  distributions  are  not  excessive  and  do  not   72
threaten the liquidity of the firm. However, there is no particular reason to expect that losses are 
reflected in earnings any sooner than gains.   
 
Joos and Lang (1994), for example, argue that cross country differences in NUC are attributable 
to the relative importance of law versus the ‘true and fair view concept’, the source of capital 
(public or private debt, concentrated or widespread ownership), and whether there is a direct 
relation  between  taxation  and  a  firm’s  financial  report.  Others  suggest  that  macroeconomic 
factors play a role to explain NUC.   
 
In general, it would seem that a downward bias in earnings (i.e., NUC) is expected when net 
income is used to base wealth distributions on, as is usually the case in code law regimes. 
 
4.2.3  The influence of the earnings definition on conservatism  
Giner and Rees (2001) and Pope and Walker (1999), have shown that the degree of conservatism 
in earnings is also sensitive to the definition of earnings. Specifically, while UK ordinary earnings 
are less conservative than US net income, those differences disappear when UK earnings after 
extraordinary items are compared with US net income. Pope and Walker (1999)
38 conclude that 
much of the conservatism in earnings is obtained via extraordinary items. It is important to note 
that the contractual explanation for conservatism in accounting earnings depends on the use of 
those earnings in contracts. Therefore, if ordinary income is what various parties contract on, 
then we should expect conservatism due to contracting in ordinary income, not in income after 
extraordinary items. The definition of clean surplus income ensures that companies can only 
make balance sheet adjustments by passing them through the income statement.   
 
                                                            
38 See also, for example, O’Hanlon 2000, and O’Hanlon and Pope 1999, Beaver and Ryan 2000, Basu 2001,and 
Chandra et al. 2004.   73
If net income is predominantly used in contracts, and conservatism is mainly due to contractual 
preferences, then net income should be more conservative than clean surplus income. In other 
words, the net effect of equity changes that are not passed through earnings should be to make 
net income more conservative. It seems that common law countries have more legal scope to 
make dirty surplus changes in equity. This is consistent with the idea that in common law regimes 
NRC in earnings is efficient and that this type of conservatism is forged in part through dirty 
surplus flows. At any rate, studying clean surplus income conservatism facilitates the comparison 
of contracting versus non-contracting explanations for the existence of conservatism.   
 
4.2.4  Predictions 
Our reasoning so far allows us to make specific predictions about conservatism in clean surplus 
income and net income, and about cross-country differences in conservatism. We state these 
predictions formally as hypotheses. 
 
News related conservatism in earnings is a feature of efficient contracting. We therefore expect 
that the earnings definition that is used in contracts between interested parties of the firm will be 
more conservative. The literature has suggested that bottom line net income is the basis for most 
contracts and not clean surplus income. Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 1: News related conservatism in net income will be larger than news related conservatism in clean 
surplus income. 
 
Note  that  we  expect  these  differences  of  conservatism  between  earnings  definitions  to  hold 
irrespective  of  the  institutional  setting  (i.e.,  country)  that  we  conduct  our  investigation  in. 
However, the importance of earnings as a contracting device is higher in countries where the 
prime function of earnings is to disclose information. In these countries the NRC in net income   74
should  be  more  pronounced  than  in  countries  where  earnings  are  used  predominantly  to 
distribute wealth. Therefore, while we expect NRC in net income to always be larger than in clean 
surplus income, we also expect the difference in net income and clean surplus income NRC to be 
larger in the first group of countries. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The difference between news related conservatism in net income and in clean surplus income will 
be more pronounced in those countries where earnings are primarily used to disclose information to outside parties.  
 
We expect that the net effect of dirty surplus flows (the difference between net income and 
clean surplus income) is to increase NRC.  
 
The effect of dirty surplus on NUC depends on the institutional setting. If earnings are 
used for distribution, dirty surplus flows are used to decrease reported net income and, by 
comparison, clean surplus income should be less downward biased.   
 
Hypothesis 3a:  We expect clean surplus income to exhibit less news unrelated conservatism than net 
income  in  those  countries  where  earnings  are  used  in  an  institutional  setting  to  distribute  wealth  to 
stakeholders.     
 
On the other hand, when earnings are not used for distribution purposes, management will have 
incentives to report on average higher net income. Dirty surplus flows should in that case bolster 
net income and their net effect should be to make net income in countries where earnings have a 
disclosure function on average less biased downward. Clean surplus income in these countries will 
be adjusted for these income bolstering dirty surplus flows and, consequently, will display more 
NUC. Thus, 
   75
Hypothesis 3b: We expect clean surplus income to exhibit more news unrelated conservatism than net income in 
those countries where earnings are used in an institutional setting to disclose information. 
 
Indeed, the literature’s crude distinction between code and common law institutional regimes 
leaves us (in our sample) with just two common law countries (UK and Ireland).  We will be able 
to test the effect of institutions on NUC with our limited samples only.   
 
4.3       Design issues 
4.3.1  Data 
The data used in this study is taken from the Global Vantage active/industrial research file, which 
contains financial statement and stock return information for listed firms in a large number of 
countries. We select non-financial companies
39 (CD-Rom dated December 2003) in 1993 to 2002, 
which were listed and domiciled in the 14 EU member states (15 minus 1, Luxembourg). The 
financial figures are fully consolidated and the statements are prepared under local GAAP. We 
exclude firms that changed their fiscal years in the testing period and countries with less than 100 
firm-year observations (Luxembourg). For comparability purposes, all data are expressed in Euro 
using historical translation rate with GBP as the primary currency for the translation.  
 
We include only observations with market value of shareholders’ equity larger than 1 million, 
because it is used as our primary deflator of accounting variables. Also we require the book value 
of shareholders’ equity to be non-negative and exclude observations with obvious data coding 
errors
40.  Firms  should  publish  sufficient  information  for  us  to  calculate  returns,  reported 
earnings, clean surplus earnings, and dirty surplus flows. Finally, market value deflated reported 
earnings, clean surplus earnings, and dirty surplus flows should fall between –1 and 1. As a result, 
                                                            
39 Financial firms are quite different from industry firms in terms of their timeliness. 
40 There are firms with data coding errors with the reported dividends.   76
our primary sample includes 13,239 observations in total, and the sample sizes range between 154 
firm-years in Austria, and 5077 firm-years in the UK.    
 
4.3.2  Earnings and return measures 
We measure reported earnings (RE G182) as the sum of net income before extraordinary items 
and extraordinary items. The pro forma clean surplus earnings (NICL) are calculated on the basis 
of the clean surplus relation, which requires earnings to be equal to the changes of shareholders’ 
equity  net  of  the  effects  of  capital  transactions  with  equity  holders,  i.e.  issuance  of  stock, 
repurchase  of  stocks,  or distribution  of  dividends.  In appendix  4.1,  we  define  another clean 
surplus earnings measure to be certain both measures end up the same figure. Hence, our clean 
surplus earnings are defined as follows
41: 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i CAPS PRC SCO PSTK CSTK TSTK DVT SEQ NICL , , , . . , , , , ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ + + ∆ =
 
Where: 
t i SEQ , ∆  (SEG G193): Changes of shareholders’ equity of company i in period t;  
t i DVT ,  (DVT G425): Total dividend payments of company i in period t; 
t i TSTK , ∆  (TSTK G180): Repurchase of treasury stock of company i in period t; 
t i CSTK , ∆  (CSTK G177): Issuances of common stock of company i in period t; 
t i PSTK , ∆  (PSTK G268): Issuances of preferred stock of company i in period t; 
t i SCO , ∆  (SCO G179): Issuances of other share capital of company i in period t; 
t i PRC , ∆  (PRC G178): Issuances of participation rights certificates of company i in period t; 
t i CAPS , ∆  (CAPS G181): Changes of capital surplus of company i in period t. 
                                                            
41 Similar measures can be found in Lo and Lys (2000), Dhaliwal et al. (1999), and Biddle and Choi (2004). Unlike 
their measure, we add back all dividends except stock dividends, which is not available in Global Vantage (GV). Our 
measure takes into account country level differences but subject to the appropriateness of item classification made by 
GV. We don’t use net capital contributions, which are taken from cash flow statements, as cash flow statements are 
not presented consistently in Europe.      77
Note that the balance sheet is presented either before or after profits appropriation. We adjust 
the timing of dividend payments whenever necessary to reflect profit appropriation status. For 
example,  if  current  shareholders’  equity  is  reported  after  profits  appropriation  (excluding 
dividends), we add back current period dividends to clean surplus net income; and if previous 
period shareholders’ equity is reported after profits appropriation (excluding dividends in period 
t-1), then we add back previous period dividends. Similarly, we do not add back the dividend of a 
particular period if firms choose to report pre-profits appropriation shareholders’ equity in that 
period.  
 
Both earnings measures are scaled by the market value of equity (MKVAL) at t-1. We measure 
stock returns (MKRTN) (Pt + Dt - Pt-1) / Pt-1 as the fiscal year holding-period returns for each 
firm-year, including dividends. Pt (t-1) is the stock returns in period t (t-1) and Dt is the dividend 
payments in period t.  
 
4.3.3  Measurement of conservatism 
4.3.3.1 News unrelated conservatism  
Two  accounting  based  measures  are  used  to  evaluate  NUC
42  in  earnings:  return  on  assets 
(ROA)
43, and return on equity (ROE)
44. They are defined in the form of both RE and CE (Joos 
and Lang 1994, Givoly and Hayn 2000, and Givoly et al. 2003) to measure the tendency of 
reporting lower or more volatile profits. ROA and ROE are common measures of profitability in 
the literature (Joos and Lang 1994, and Givoly et al. 2003). We compare the mean, the median, 
the variances, and the skewness of reported earnings and clean surplus earnings.  
 
                                                            
42 We present the measurements and the results for our third hypothesis first, and then the first two hypotheses. 
43 ROA is equal to reported (clean surplus) earnings / average total (clean surplus) assets. 
44 ROE is equal to (reported (clean surplus) earnings + preferred dividends) / average (clean surplus) common 
equity.    78
We also use two market-based ratios to measure NUC: the earnings to price (EP) and the book 
to market (BM) ratios. The former is linked to earnings conservatism and the later to book 
conservatism  for  the  sake  of  completeness.  The  UK  should  have  higher  EP  in  contrast  to 
Germany and France, because firms are more likely to report lower profitability ratios when their 
earnings are used for wealth distribution purposes, e.g. Germany and France. The BM ratio is 
expected to follow the opposite pattern, whereby the book value is more conservative in the UK 
than that in Germany and France.  
 
4.3.3.2 News related conservatism 
4.3.3.2.1 Incidence of losses  
Firms tend to smooth earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses for compensation and 
valuation purposes (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). When facing higher litigation costs and strong 
demand for information in the capital market, firms tend to report losses as it is expected on a 
timelier  basis  (Burgstahler  and  Dichev  1997,  and  Givoly  and  Hayn  2000),  and  hence,  the 
incidence of losses is regarded as a crude indicator of NRC in earnings. Companies are more 
likely  to  report  negative  earnings  than  to  report  negative  clean  surplus  earnings,  and  the 
difference should be more pronounced in common law countries than that in code law countries.  
 
4.3.3.2.2 Asymmetric timeliness of RE and NICL 
Measurement  of  both  news-related  and  news-unrelated  conservatism  in  reported  and  clean 
surplus earnings is though the Basu model (1997) (see also Pope and Walker 1999, Ball et al. 
2000, and Giner and Rees 2001). 
 
For reported earnings, the model is specified as follows (RE-model): 
t t t t
t
t R D R D
MV
RE
ε α α α α + + + + =
−
* 3 2 1 0
1
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t RE   is  the  reported  earnings  after  extraordinary  items.  1 − t MV   is  the  market  value  of 
shareholders’ equity at t-1.  t R  is the shareholders returns, including dividends.  t D  is a dummy 
variable, which takes the value of one, if the company's shareholder return is negative, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
We  estimate  a  similar  model  using  clean  surplus  earnings  (NICL-Model): 
t t t t
t
t R D R D
MV
NICL
ε α α α α + + + + =
−
* 3 2 1 0
1
;  where  NICL  is  our  measure  of  clean  surplus 
earnings. 
 
Current changes in stock prices are used as proxies for ‘news’; negative changes are regarded as 
“bad news” and positive changes are “good news”. In our constrained model, α1 and α3 are 
constructed to be zero, and the Basu model (1997) is reduced to earnings-returns model, which 
measures  how  earnings  are  related  to  news  in  general.  When  the  model  is  estimated  in  its 
unrestricted form, α3, the coefficient on bad news, represents the differential effect of bad news. 
Given the existence of news-related earnings conservatism, α3 should be significantly positive, 
and the sum of α2 and α3 should be larger than α2 in the constrained model. 
 
News-unrelated conservatism in contrast will affect the intercept in the Basu model (1997). A 
lower intercept, α0, represents higher NUC (see, Giner and Rees 2001, and Basu 2001, 1335). 
 
We estimate the Basu model (1997), for both reported earnings (RE) and clean surplus earnings 
(NICL) in (i) the restricted form, and (ii) the unrestricted form.  
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4.3.3.2.3 Earnings reversal 
We also run a first order time series model suggested by Basu (1997) for both reported earnings 
and  clean  surplus  earnings.  The  stock  market  incorporates  firm’s  investment  and  financing 
decisions, which are not included in accounting reports. Hence, we consider the earnings’ reversal 
model as a direct measure of accounting conservatism. The faster negative earnings reverse, the 
more conservative the earnings measure is.   
 
Specifically, for reported earnings, the model is as follows (RE-model):  
t t t t t t t t t MV RECH DLRE MV RECH DLRE MV RECH µ β β α α + + + + = − − − − − − − 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 / * / /  
 
t RECH  are changes of reported earnings after extraordinary items at t.  j t P− is the market value 
of equity at t-j. And  1 − t DLRE  is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if  1 − t RECH <0, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
We estimate a similar model with clean surplus income (NICL) as the dependent variable (RE-
model):  
t t t t t t t t t MV NICLCH DLNICL MV NICLCH DLNICL MV NICLCH µ β β α α + + + + = − − − − − − − 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 / * / /
 
t NICLCH are changes of clean surplus earnings after extraordinary items at t.  j t P− is  market 
value  of  equity  at  t-j.  And  1 − it DLNICL   is  a  dummy  variable,  which  takes  the  value  of  1  if 
1 − t NICLCH <0, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The dummy for negative earnings changes is considered as the indicator of the speed of negative 
earnings reversal. Negative earnings reverse faster than positive earnings, if  1 β  is significantly 
negative.     81
4.4  Results 
4.4.1  Magnitude of clean-surplus violations 
Table  4.1  provides  summary  statistics  for  the  variables  used  in  this  study.  Stock  returns  are 
relatively larger in Greece and Spain than in other European member states; however, they are 
quite similar in magnitude in remaining countries. On average, the reported earnings are running 
from 3%, e.g. Germany, Italy, and Sweden, to 7%, e.g. Finland, the Netherlands, and Spain. 
Consistent  with  previous  studies  on  earnings  conservatism,  among  our  three  representative 
counties, Germany reports the lowest profits in median, which is followed by France and the 
UK. The magnitude of clean surplus income shows similar pattern. It appears that these two 
earnings measures are comparable across European member states in magnitude; however, clean 
surplus earnings always show higher volatility than reported earnings.   
 
The dirty surplus flows are left-skewed, and firms report –4% to 1% dirty surplus flows on 
average.  With  the  exception  of  Sweden,  the  majority of  European  firms  in  each state  show 
negative dirty surplus flows, which are often indistinguishable from 0. It seems that they are more 
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TABLE 4.1: Summary Statistics of Variables Concerned 
 
R  RE  NICL  DSF  Number of firm-year 
observations 
                Firm-years 
Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std. 
Austria  154 0.04  0.02 0.24 0.05 0.06  0.15 0.05  0.05  0.17  -0.00  -0.00  0.13 
Belgium  359 0.07  0.03 0.37 0.06 0.06  0.09 0.03  0.03  0.09  -0.02  -0.02  0.05 
Denmark  468 0.04  0.00 0.37 0.06 0.07  0.12 0.06  0.05  0.13  0.00  -0.00  0.09 
Finland  400 0.08  0.03 0.41 0.07 0.07  0.10 0.08  0.06  0.12  0.00  -0.00  0.08 
France  2109 0.06  0.02 0.45 0.04 0.05  0.11 0.02  0.03  0.11  -0.02  -0.01  0.06 
Germany  1312 0.03  0.00 0.33 0.03 0.04  0.12 0.03  0.03  0.12  -0.00  -0.00  0.07 
Greece  235 0.38  -0.14 1.28 0.05 0.04  0.05 0.01  0.02  0.06  -0.04  -0.02  0.05 
Ireland  202 0.13  0.07 0.44 0.07 0.08  0.08 0.07  0.08  0.11  -0.00  -0.00  0.09 
Italy  555 0.06  0.00 0.44 0.03 0.04  0.09 0.03  0.03  0.11  0.01  -0.00  0.08 
Netherlands  776 0.07  0.04 0.36 0.07 0.08  0.10 0.04  0.06  0.11  -0.03  -0.01  0.07 
Portugal  175 0.10  0.03 0.39 0.06 0.06  0.07 0.03  0.03  0.13  -0.02  -0.02  0.10 
Spain  693 0.16  0.08 0.42 0.07 0.07  0.07 0.06  0.05  0.08  -0.02  -0.01  0.06 
Sweden  724 0.02  -0.01 0.46 0.03 0.05  0.15 0.04  0.06  0.15  0.02  0.00  0.09 
UK  5077 0.11  0.05 0.50 0.04 0.06  0.11 0.05  0.06  0.14  0.01  -0.00  0.09 
Notes:   This table provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The sample consists of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have Global Vantage data needed to 
calculate returns, reported earnings, clean surplus earnings, and dirty surplus flows. The firm-year observations’ market value of shareholders’ equity is larger than 1 million, the 
shareholders’ equity is positive, and the deflated reported earnings, clean surplus earnings, and dirty surplus flows fall between –1 and 1.  
Variable definitions: Std.: standard deviation; R: annual return, including dividends; RE: reported earnings; NICL: clean surplus accounting earnings calculated according 
to the clean surplus relation, which is defined in session 3.2; DSF: the difference between RE and NICL. All accounting variables are scaled by beginning-of-year market value of 
shareholders’ equity. Observations that fall into the top or the bottom one percent each tail of the variables used are identified as outliers and are excluded.   83
4.4.2  Conservatism measured   
4.4.2.1 News unrelated conservatism 
Table 4.2 presents the univariate analysis of NUC. Panel A and panel B present the estimated 
mean, median, and standard deviation of ROA and ROE respectively. On average, clean surplus 
ROA (ROE) is most often lower than reported ROA (ROE) except in Ireland, Italy, Sweden and 
UK. Most importantly, Ireland reports higher median clean surplus ROA and ROE, and Sweden 
reports 1% higher clean surplus ROA, while the UK reports 3% higher clean surplus ROE. 
Overall, clean surplus ROA (ROE) are more volatile than reported ROA (ROE), except that in 
Belgium and in Germany, there is a slight reduction of volatility with the clean surplus measures. 
Our two accounting based conservatism measures show a consistent pattern with respect to 
France, Germany, and UK. The UK has the highest profitability measures among all, and its 
profitability measures are more volatile than the other two countries. It seems that the reported 
ROA (ROE) is higher in France than in Germany, however, the clean surplus ROA (ROE) is 
lower in France than in Germany. France seems to have the most discretion in reporting dirty 
surplus flows.  
 
Panel  C  and  panel  D  in  table  4.2  are  the  summary  statistics  of  market-based  measure  of 
profitability. In Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain, the clean surplus 
EP ratio is relatively lower than reported EP ratio. However, it is difficult to interpret EP ratio 
because it is also a measure of profitability and our findings here are mixed. Both the reported 
and the clean surplus EP ratio are higher in the UK than in Germany and in France. As a result 
of this, Germany and France display more conservatism in terms of EP ratio. The clean surplus 





   84
TABLE 4.2: Univariate Analysis of News Un-related Conservatism 
 
ROA  ROACL  Number of firm-year 
observations  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std. 
Panel A                                    
Austria  157  0.018  0.018  0.043  0.016  0.014  0.048 
Belgium  368  0.035  0.033  0.054  0.020  0.020  0.052 
Denmark  478  0.044  0.044  0.062  0.037  0.038  0.069 
Finland  415  0.047  0.048  0.059  0.043  0.043  0.070 
France  2140  0.026  0.031  0.068  0.009  0.019  0.074 
Germany  1309  0.021  0.023  0.061  0.019  0.019  0.060 
Greece  237  0.061  0.053  0.049  0.025  0.022  0.067 
Ireland  208  0.048  0.064  0.098  0.050  0.067  0.130 
Italy  545  0.020  0.023  0.053  0.021  0.019  0.053 
Netherlands  780  0.057  0.062  0.067  0.035  0.042  0.079 
Portugal  165  0.031  0.030  0.031  0.014  0.018  0.055 
Spain  695  0.046  0.042  0.044  0.038  0.033  0.051 
Sweden  744  0.008  0.044  0.152  0.032  0.045  0.148 
UK  5141  0.038  0.056  0.108  0.041  0.053  0.126 
               
    ROE  ROECL 
  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std. 
Panel B               
Austria  157  0.047  0.069  0.173  0.036  0.055  0.187 
Belgium  368  0.086  0.100  0.161  0.049  0.058  0.163 
Denmark  478  0.097  0.103  0.149  0.082  0.089  0.170 
Finland  415  0.104  0.118  0.136  0.102  0.103  0.168 
France  2140  0.064  0.097  0.192  0.020  0.058  0.211 
Germany  1309  0.051  0.086  0.248  0.046  0.071  0.239 
Greece  237  0.137  0.111  0.131  0.051  0.043  0.166 
Ireland  208  0.132  0.162  0.193  0.136  0.172  0.267 
Italy  545  0.046  0.070  0.148  0.050  0.061  0.170 
Netherlands  780  0.170  0.175  0.210  0.095  0.128  0.249 
Portugal  165  0.091  0.088  0.090  0.034  0.058  0.178 
Spain  695  0.112  0.112  0.109  0.097  0.093  0.130 
Sweden  744  0.031  0.112  0.288  0.076  0.109  0.290 
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    EP  EPCL 
  Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std. 
Panel C                
Austria  109  0.101  0.077  0.085  0.111  0.079  0.106 
Belgium  271  0.081  0.067  0.059  0.067  0.048  0.065 
Denmark  368  0.089  0.072  0.068  0.094  0.071  0.087 
Finland  317  0.094  0.081  0.058  0.102  0.077  0.078 
France  1498  0.073  0.061  0.048  0.063  0.047  0.060 
Germany  934  0.076  0.056  0.076  0.074  0.051  0.085 
Greece  158  0.050  0.049  0.032  0.036  0.028  0.031 
Ireland  150  0.091  0.078  0.048  0.108  0.087  0.077 
Italy  383  0.057  0.048  0.040  0.064  0.046  0.064 
Netherlands  587  0.088  0.082  0.048  0.080  0.069  0.054 
Portugal  111  0.071  0.064  0.044  0.080  0.069  0.054 
Spain  583  0.076  0.069  0.040  0.070  0.058  0.055 
Sweden  489  0.087  0.077  0.064  0.094  0.079  0.078 
UK  3691  0.077  0.069  0.044  0.092  0.071  0.076 
               
    BM  BMCL 
                    Mean  Median  Std.  Mean  Median  Std. 
Panel D               
Austria  159  1.217  0.875  1.111  1.236  0.875  1.180 
Belgium  367  0.739  0.654  0.448  0.735  0.647  0.446 
Denmark  479  0.931  0.864  0.623  0.889  0.806  0.592 
Finland  415  0.802  0.702  0.471  0.793  0.693  0.464 
France  2140  0.760  0.614  0.545  0.757  0.614  0.542 
Germany  1341  0.691  0.537  0.575  0.691  0.539  0.575 
Greece  235  0.531  0.403  0.442  0.500  0.385  0.418 
Ireland  209  0.615  0.529  0.399  0.561  0.466  0.375 
Italy  541  0.760  0.678  0.476  0.738  0.653  0.477 
Netherlands  788  0.610  0.520  0.433  0.600  0.512  0.425 
Portugal  166  0.908  0.679  0.759  0.780  0.580  0.614 
Spain  694  0.739  0.648  0.420  0.701  0.605  0.417 
Sweden  742  0.683  0.583  0.446  0.682  0.583  0.446 
UK  5145  0.679  0.520  0.538  0.624  0.485  0.476 
Notes:   This table provides descriptive statistics on univariate measure of accounting conservatism. The sample 
consists of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have Global Vantage data needed to calculate return on assets, return on 
equity, earnings to price, and book to market ratio. The firm-year observations’ market value of shareholders’ equity 
is larger than 1 million, their shareholders’ equity is  positive, and the deflated reported earnings, clean surplus 
earnings, and dirty surplus flows fall between –1 and 1.  
Panel A and B present the mean, the median, and the standard deviation of accounting-based measures of 
news unrelated conservatism.  
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The BM ratio shows another pattern. Except Austria, the reported BM ratio is always higher than 
clean surplus BM ratio in the EU. The growth opportunity as represented by book value of 
shareholders’ equity is the lowest in France, and it is followed by Germany and the UK. This is 
consistent with the suggestion that earnings are more conservative in the UK than in Germany 
and in France, and book value is more conservative in France than in Germany and in UK. 
Moreover, Germany has the least discretion to report dirty surplus flows, which is followed by 
France and UK. 
 
4.4.2.2  News related conservatism 
4.4.2.2.1  Proportion of incidence of losses  
Table 4.3 lists the percentage of observations with negative RE or CE. CE is more likely to be 
negative than RE in all 14 EU countries, and hence, it seems to be more conservative than RE. 
In the most extreme case, 27% (followed by 23%, and 13%) more firms would have to record 
negative earnings if they are obliged to report CE in Greece (followed by Portugal, and the 
Netherlands). The likelihood of reporting a CE loss is comparable in France, Germany, and the 
UK with the UK the least likely. However, the difference in the probabilities of reporting loss 
between RE and CE is the largest in Germany. 
 
Notes to table 4.2 (continued): 
Variable definitions: ROA: return on total asset, which is the ratio of reported earnings to total assets; 
ROACL: clean surplus return on assets, which is the ratio of clean surplus earnings to clean surplus assets; ROE: 
return  on  equity,  which  is  the  ratio  of  reported  earnings  adding  back  preferred  dividends  to  book  value  of 
shareholders’ equity; ROECL: clean surplus return on equity, which is the ratio of clean surplus accounting earnings 
adding  back  preferred  dividends  to  clean  surplus  shareholders’  equity;  Std.:  standard  deviation.  Firm  years 
observations included in this analysis should have enough information to calculate ROA, ROACL, ROE, and 
ROECL. Observations that fall into the top or the bottom one percent each tail of the variables used are identified 
as outliers and are excluded 
Panel C and Panel D present the mean, the median, and the standard deviation of market-based measure of 
news unrelated conservatism.  
Variable definitions: EP: earnings to price, whish is the ratio of reported earnings to market value of 
shareholders’ equity; EPCL: clean surplus earnings to price, which is the ratio of clean surplus earnings to market 
value of shareholders’ equity; BM: book to market, which is the ratio of book value of shareholders’ equity to the 
market value of shareholders’ equity; and BMCL: clean surplus book to market, which is the ratio of clean surplus 
earnings  to  market  value  of  shareholfer’s  equity.  Firm  years  observations  included  in  this  analysis  should  have 
enough information to calculate EP, EPCL, BM, and BMCL. Observations that fall into the top or the bottom one 
percent each tail of the variables used are identified as outliers and are excluded. Furthermore, when calculating the 
EP ratio,  we include only firms,  which report  positive (clean surplus) earnings, since it  is difficult to interpret 
negative EP.   87
TABLE 4.3: Percentage of Observations with Negative RE or NICL 
 
RE  NICL    Number of firm-year 
observations  <0  >0  %<0  %>0  <0  >0  %<0  %>0 Diff.<0 
Austria  154  30  124  0.19  0.81  40  114  0.26  0.74  0.06 
Belgium  359  52  307  0.14  0.86  89  270  0.25  0.75  0.10 
Denmark  468  63  405  0.13  0.87  98  369  0.21  0.79  0.07 
Finland  400  50  350  0.13  0.88  80  320  0.20  0.80  0.08 
France  2109  380  1729  0.18  0.82  593  1515  0.28  0.72  0.10 
Germany  1312  279  1010  0.21  0.77  339  968  0.26  0.74  0.05 
Greece  235  12  223  0.05  0.95  75  160  0.32  0.68  0.27 
Ireland  202  34  168  0.17  0.83  45  157  0.22  0.78  0.05 
Italy  555  115  440  0.21  0.79  143  412  0.26  0.74  0.05 
Netherlands  776  85  691  0.11  0.89  187  589  0.24  0.76  0.13 
Portugal  175  18  157  0.10  0.90  58  117  0.33  0.67  0.23 
Spain  693  43  648  0.06  0.94  104  589  0.15  0.85  0.09 
Sweden  724  193  531  0.27  0.73  194  530  0.27  0.73  0.00 
UK  5077  935  4142  0.18  0.82  1229  3848  0.24  0.76  0.06 
Notes:   This table provides information on the proportion of negative or positive figures in reported earnings and 
clean surplus earnings. The sample consists of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have Global Vantage data needed to 
calculate returns, reported earnings, clean surplus earnings, and dirty surplus flows. The firm-year observations’ 
market value of shareholders’ equity is larger than 1 million, their shareholders’ equity is positive, and the deflated 
reported earnings, clean surplus earnings, and dirty surplus flows fall between –1 and 1.  
Variable definitions: RE: reported earnings; NICL: clean surplus accounting earnings calculated according 
to the clean surplus relation, which is defined in session 3.2; and Diff.: the difference in the percentage of negative 
RE and NICL. Observations that fall into the top or the bottom one percent each tail of the variables used are 
identified as outliers and are excluded. 
 
4.4.2.2.2 Estimates on the asymmetric timeliness of RE and CE 
In  2  panels  of  table  4.4,  we  list  our  pooled  cross-section  time-series  country-by-country 
estimations of the Basu (1997) model in its restricted form (column 3-6 of panel A and B) and in 
its unrestricted form (column 7-10 of panel A, and B).  
 
We will focus specifically on the last 5 columns in each panel in subsequent analysis since we are 
primarily interested in the interpretation of conservatism in clean surplus earnings.  
 
Consistent  with  previous  findings,  the  coefficients  on  bad  news  interaction  terms  (α3)  are 
generally significantly positive in both the RE and the CE models with Austria and Portugal as   88
the only exceptions. The results suggest that Germany is the most conservative country in terms 
of news related conservatism, which is followed by the UK and France. As we take earnings after 
extraordinary items as our measure for reported earnings, these results are very similar to those in 
Giner and Rees (2001), and Pope and Walker (1999).   
 
TABLE 4.4: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Basu (1997) Models on RE and NICL 
 
Restricted  Unrestricted  Number of firm-year 
Observations   α0    α2    R  α0    α1    α2    α3    R 
Panel A: RE-Model                             
Austria  157  0.048 *** 0.049   0.01  0.031   0.044   0.089   0.077   0.01 
Belgium  364  0.052 *** 0.095 *** 0.14  0.070 ***  0.004   0.051 *** 0.172 *** 0.18 
Denmark  472  0.054 *** 0.099 *** 0.09  0.083 ***  0.004   0.023   0.241 *** 0.14 
Finland  406  0.063 *** 0.107 *** 0.18  0.086 ***  0.030   0.054 *** 0.162 *** 0.22 
France  2140  0.035 *** 0.092 *** 0.15  0.066 *** -0.006   0.026 *** 0.182 *** 0.21 
Germany  1328  0.027 *** 0.120 *** 0.10  0.049 ***  0.023 **  0.038 **  0.270 *** 0.15 
Greece  236  0.045 *** 0.016 *** 0.18  0.076 *** -0.010   0.002   0.089 *** 0.35 
Ireland  205  0.065 *** 0.070 *** 0.14  0.092 *** -0.016   0.021   0.133 *** 0.19 
Italy  562  0.024 *** 0.081 *** 0.16  0.054 ***  0.007   0.020 *  0.224 *** 0.24 
Netherlands  785  0.059 *** 0.092 *** 0.10  0.095 *** -0.011   -0.005   0.243 *** 0.17 
Portugal  176  0.052 *** 0.069 *** 0.14  0.057 ***  0.011   0.058 *** 0.089   0.16 
Spain  700  0.063 *** 0.053 *** 0.10  0.071 ***  0.007   0.037 *** 0.101 *** 0.12 
Sweden  737  0.023 *** 0.150 *** 0.21  0.064 ***  0.021   0.044 **  0.294 *** 0.29 
UK  5136  0.036 *** 0.073 *** 0.11  0.072 *** -0.009 **  0.011 **  0.194 *** 0.18 
                               
Restricted  Unrestricted 
  α0    α2    R  α0    α1    α2    α3    R 
Panel B: NICL-Model                            
Austria  157  0.039 *** 0.089   0.01  0.045   -0.008   0.070   0.017   0.01 
Belgium  364  0.028 *** 0.082 *** 0.09  0.033 ***  0.023   0.064 *** 0.143 *** 0.11 
Denmark  472  0.055 *** 0.100 *** 0.08  0.079 ***  0.008   0.035   0.222 *** 0.11 
Finland  406  0.066 *** 0.110 *** 0.13  0.092 *** -0.007   0.050 *  0.155 *** 0.15 
France  2140  0.013 *** 0.073 *** 0.07  0.037 *** -0.010   0.025 *** 0.120 *** 0.09 
Germany  1328  0.027 *** 0.094 *** 0.06  0.049 ***  0.008   0.018   0.216 *** 0.09 
Greece  236  0.010 *** 0.014 *** 0.09  0.033 *** -0.006   0.004   0.068 *** 0.16 
Ireland  205  0.068 *** 0.013   0.00  0.111 *** -0.037   -0.064 **  0.173 **  0.05 
Italy  562  0.031 *** 0.060 *** 0.05  0.060 *** -0.013   0.005   0.146 *** 0.08 
Netherlands  785  0.032 *** 0.075 *** 0.05  0.069 *** -0.019   -0.020   0.207 *** 0.09   89
Portugal  176  0.024 **  0.087 *** 0.07  0.038 **  -0.002   0.058   0.113   0.08 
Spain  700  0.050 *** 0.038 *** 0.03  0.060 ***  0.010   0.018   0.133 *** 0.05 
Sweden  737  0.040 *** 0.144 *** 0.17  0.070 ***  0.019   0.064 *** 0.227 *** 0.21 
UK  5136  0.042 *** 0.078 *** 0.08  0.076 *** -0.012 **  0.020 *** 0.170 *** 0.11 
Notes:   This table provides estimates of seemingly unrelated regression Basu model (1997). The sample consists of 
all 1993-2002 firm-years that have Global Vantage data needed to calculate returns, reported earnings, and clean 
surplus earnings. All accounting variables are scaled by market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of the 
period. The firm-year observations’ market value of shareholders’ equity is larger than 1 million, their shareholders’ 
equity is positive, and the deflated reported earnings, clean surplus earnings, and dirty surplus flows fall between –1 
and 1.  
Variable definitions: RE: reported earnings; NICL: clean surplus earnings;  t D : a dummy variable, which is 
1 if the return < 0, and 0 otherwise. 
Models: RE-Model:  t t R D t R t D
t MV
t RE
ε α α α α + + + + =
−
* 3 2 1 0
1
 
             NICL-Model:  t t R D t R t D
t MV
t NICL
ε α α α α + + + + =
−
* 3 2 1 0
1
 
*** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level; * denotes significance at 10% level. 
 
The results also show that NRC (α3) appears to be lower for clean surplus earnings than for 
reported earnings in most of the countries, except in Ireland and Spain. Thus our first hypothesis 
is  largely  supported.  We  also  notice  that  the  differences  between  country-specific  NRC  (α3) 
disappear in the CE model. Referring to hypothesis 2, the differences between NRC in RE and 
CE is smaller in Belgian, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, and UK.   
 
Finally, in most cases, NUC (α0) appears to be lower in clean surplus earnings relative to reported 
earnings except in Ireland, Italy, Sweden, and UK. The news dummies are not significant in both 
Panel A and Panel B, which is consistent with our expectation.  
 
4.4.2.2.3 Estimates on earnings reversal 
Table 4.5 presents our estimated coefficients and R-squares of earnings reversal models. Our 
interaction  term  for  bad  news  is  significantly  negative  for  reported  earnings  in  Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK. The results suggest that 
negative earnings are more likely to reverse than positive earnings in these countries. This could 
be interpreted as suggesting that earnings are conservative in its speed to absorb bad news or 
negative earnings are more transitory than positive earnings.    90
The results from the CE model suggest that clean surplus earnings show a higher tendency for 
reversal than reported earnings except in Belgium. The estimated coefficients of clean surplus 
earnings are more negative and more likely to be significant than reported earnings. However, 
clean surplus earnings do not suggest a higher degree of reversal except that in Belgium, France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. Taken together, our findings are consistent that the higher degree 
of earnings reversal is suggestive of the asymmetry timeliness argument. As clean surplus earnings 
are often not used for contracting purpose, they exhibit a lower degree of NRC.  
 
TABLE 4.5: OLS Robust Regression Results on Earnings Reversal 
 
RE-Model  NICL-Model 
Number of firm-year 
observations   DLRE   RECHL   INTRE   R  DLNICL  
NICL 
CHL   
INT 
NICL   R 
Austria  114  0.002   -0.155   -0.290   0.09  -0.002   -0.534 *** 0.135   0.16 
Belgium  255 -0.007   -0.166   -0.600 **  0.18  -0.005   -0.038   -0.710 **  0.14 
Denmark  353 -0.020   -0.165   -0.495 **  0.13  0.031   -0.286 **  -0.054   0.11 
Finland  298  0.011   0.012   -0.329   0.04  -0.010   -0.401 *** 0.043   0.19 
France  1499 -0.022 ***  0.079   -0.790 *** 0.08  0.013   -0.118   -0.318 *** 0.08 
Germany  982 -0.028 ***  -0.189 **  -0.303 **  0.08  -0.004   -0.457 *** 0.210 *  0.13 
Greece  143 -0.013 *  -0.149   -0.540   0.09  -0.001   -0.334 **  -0.149   0.16 
Ireland  154 -0.064 ***  -0.028   -1.499 *** 0.26  -0.022   -0.337 *  0.037   0.10 
Italy  376  0.010   0.039   -0.667 **  0.10  -0.011   -0.374 *** -0.172   0.14 
NL  578 -0.035 ***  -0.164   -0.552 **  0.12  -0.003   -0.180 **  -0.493 *** 0.17 
Portugal  112 -0.009   0.052   -0.443   0.03  0.040   -0.217   -0.308   0.21 
Spain  533  0.000   -0.035   -0.178   0.01  0.011   -0.335 *** 0.208   0.12 
Sweden  480 -0.013   -0.195 **  -0.190   0.04  -0.003   -0.347 *** -0.185   0.14 
UK  3888 -0.026 ***  -0.130 ***  -0.689 *** 0.18  0.017 ** -0.337 *** -0.050   0.16 
Notes:   This  table  provides  OLS  Robust  regression  coefficients  and  R-squares  on  earnings  reversal  model.  The 
sample consists of all 1993-2002 firm-years that have Global Vantage data needed to calculate reported earnings, and 
clean surplus earnings. All accounting variables are scaled by market value of shareholders’ equity at the beginning of 
the period. The firm-year observations’ market value of shareholders’ equity is larger than 1 million, their shareholders’ 
equity is positive, and the deflated reported earnings, clean surplus earnings, and dirty surplus flows fall between –1 
and 1.  
Variable definitions: RECH: changes of reported earnings; DLRE: a dummy variable, which denote 1 if 
lagged one period reported earnings<0 and 0 otherwise; RECHL: changes of reported earnings lagged for one period; 
INTRE: an interaction term of DLRE and RECHL; NICLCH: changes of clean surplus earnings; DLNICL: a 
dummy variable, which denote 1 if lagged one period clean surplus earnings<0 and 0 otherwise; NICLCHL: changes 
of clean surplus earnings lagged for one period; INTNICL: an interaction term of DLCE and NICLCHL. 
Models: 
RE-Model:  t t MV t RECH t DLRE t MV t RECH t DLRE t MV t RECH µ β β α α + − − − + − − + − + = − 2 / 1 * 1 1 2 / 1 0 1 1 0 1 /   
NICL-Model:  t t MV t NICLCH t DLNICL t MV t NICLCH t DLNICL t MV t NICLCH µ β β α α + − − − + − − + − + = − 2 / 1 * 1 1 2 / 1 0 1 1 0 1 /  
*** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level; * denotes significance at 10% level.  91
4.5  Conclusions 
We find that both NRC and NUC are lower in clean surplus earnings than that in reported 
earnings  in  most  of  the  countries  we  studies.  The  magnitude  of  NRC  converges  when  we 
measure them in clean surplus earnings. Thus, contracting seems to be an important factor to 
explain NRC. However, our findings imply that the relevance of dirty surplus flows is more likely 
to be explained by NUC.   
 
A limitation in this version of the chapter is that we have not yet documented for the 1993-2002 
period the dirty-surplus possibilities existing in each of the 14 countries. It is an interesting thing 
to do for future research.  
 
Also, various informative refinements in the measurement of conservatism are possible. See, 
Giner and Rees (2001), and Lara et al. (2005) for possibilities that exist here. For example, yearly 
regressions should also be included, and market corrected returns can be used.  
 
A third, potential, limitation of this chapter is that we are not entirely certain how well clean 
surplus earnings be measured relying on the Global Vantage data file.   92
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APPENDIX 4.1 
Adjustments for profits appropriation statues are made to reflect the timing of the dividends 
payments. For example, if current shareholders’ equity is reported after profits appropriation 
(excluding dividends), we add back current period dividends to clean surplus net income; and if 
previous period shareholders’ equity is reported after profits appropriation (excluding dividends 
in period t-1), then we add back previous period dividends. On the contrary, we do not add back 
dividends  of  the  period  when  firms  choose  to  report  pre-profits  appropriation  shareholders’ 
equity. 
 
As an alternative, we define clean surplus earnings as follows: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i ERO CURDIF RVLRV UNNP DVT RE NICL , . . , , , , ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ =   
If  t UNNPD = 0 &  t UNNPLD  = 0 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i ERO CURDIF RVLRV UNNP DVT RE NICL , . . , 1 , , , ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ = −  
If  t UNNPD  = 1 &  t UNNPLD  = 1 
t i t i t i t i t i t i ERO CURDIF RVLRV UNNP RE NICL , . . , , , ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ =  
If  t UNNPD  =1 &  t UNNPLD  = 0 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i CURDIF RVLRV ERO UNNP DVT DVT RE NICL . . , , . 1 , , , ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + + ∆ = −  
If  t UNNPD = 0 &  t UNNPLD  = 1 
 
Where: 
t i NICL ,  = Clean surplus earnings of company i in period t; 
t i RE , ∆  (RE G182) = Changes of retained earnings of company i in period t; 
t i DVT .  (DVT G425) = Total dividends of company i in period t; 
t i UNNP, ∆  (UNNP G273) = Changes of Un-appropriated net profits
45 (shareholders’ equity session) of 
company i in period t; 
t i ERO , ∆  (ERO G653) = Changes of equity reserves_other of company i in period t; 
t i RVLRV . ∆  (RVLRV G652) = Changes of revaluation reserves of company i in period t; 
t i CURDIF. ∆ (TRANSA G192) = Changes of currency translation differences of company i in period t; 
t UNNPD  = A dummy variable, which denotes 1 if un-appropriated profits in period t is not equal to 0, 0 
otherwise; 




                                                            
45 It is also possible that un-appropriated profits (losses) are transferred out of shareholders’ equity session. In this 
case, we should also add back ‘Changes of Un-appropriated net profits/losses in the liability session/asset session)’ in theory. 
However, these two sessions in GV contain only 0 in practice, therefore, we skip them in the calculations.    94 
 
 
Chapter 5  
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This thesis focuses on the use of dirty surplus accounting flows information in security 
valuation and in contracting, which is at the heart of more recent discussions among 
academics,  standard  setters,  and  practitioners  on  the  appropriateness  of  promoting  a 
clean surplus type statement. More specifically, I examine the associations between clean 
surplus  accounting  information  and  security  returns,  the  persistency  of  clean  surplus 
earnings, and the use of dirty surplus accounting flows to forge accounting conservatism. 
  
Accounting  information  is  used  for  various  contracting  purposes,  and  the  decision 
making process of these contracting parties are complicated. The reporting of potential 
dirty surplus components also involves managerial discretions; and as the preparers of 
financial reports, firm’s managers are concerned with their personal interest. Bottom line 
numbers, or the preparation of clean surplus financial statements, could be conditioned 
on the equilibrium process of political bargaining. Hence, the trade-off between the two 
accounting principles: reliability and relevance, is a debatable choice facing the standard 
setters.  
 
Potentially, dirty surplus flows could be informative about real economic profits if being 
valued  appropriately.  The  three  major  components,  foreign  currency  translation 
differences, goodwill write-offs, and asset revaluations, actually closely resemble macro 
economic factors, growth opportunities, and the option value of residual assets.  
   95 
The inclusion of dirty surplus flows in primary financial statements could increase their 
information content and enhance their reliability. However, it is difficult to verify the 
estimated  value  of  dirty  surplus  flows,  also  standard  setters  and  auditors  would 
unavoidably be facing increased litigation risk. Needless to mention, practitioners would 
incur higher costs if the financial statements were to be prepared under a more stringent 
criteria. 
  
Empirical evidence on the use of dirty surplus flow information potentially provides 
clues  on  the  benefits  and  the  costs  involved  in  reporting  clean  surplus  financial 
statements. Given an efficient market, investors should see through accounting tricks and 
the  stock  return  incorporates  available  financial  statement  information.  Hence,  using 
stock  return  as  a  benchmark  enables  me  to  understand  investor’s  use  of  accounting 
figures for forecasting and valuation purposes.  
   
In  chapter  2,  a  capital market  study  assists  me  to  test  the  association  between  dirty 
surplus flows and economic events. In the period of 1988-1997, there were quite a few 
dirty  surplus  flows  allowed  in  the  Netherlands  and  it  seems  an  interesting  place  to 
examine the relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows. 5 components of dirty surplus 
flows: goodwill write-offs, asset revaluations, currency translation differences, sundries, 
and extraordinary dirty surplus flows were hand-collected.  
 
We  compare  two  earnings  measures  in  the  Netherlands:  clean  surplus  earnings  and 
reported earnings, and investigate the incremental relevance of three major components 
of dirty surplus flows, goodwill write-offs, asset revaluations, and currency translation 
differences.    
   96 
We find that both reported income and clean surplus income are relevant in explaining 
security returns, though the reported income seems a more relevant measure of firm 
performance.  The  aggregated  dirty  surplus  flows  are  not  a  good  indicator  of  firm 
performance with accumulation intervals up to 10-year, however, currency translation 
differences and asset revaluations, are at times incrementally relevant to returns.  
 
Chapter 3 extends the analysis to 14 EU countries. The results of the empirical analysis 
(1993-2002) indicate that dirty surplus flows are generally negative, and also economically 
significant. Consistent with the findings in the Netherlands in earlier period, reported 
income is a more persistent measure of firm performance than clean surplus income.  
 
It  is  well  know  that  stock  market  incorporates  also  firms’  financing  and  investment 
decisions, which are not directly related to their (operating) performance. To evaluate the 
relevance  of  dirty  surplus  flows  to  future  firm  performance,  this  chapter  includes 
(operating) income growth model (Aboody et al. 1999) in addition to the conventional 
returns-earnings model. These models focus on the relevancy as well as the persistency, 
and the predictability of dirty surplus flows.  
 
Dirty surplus flows are incrementally informative in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, 
and the UK. They are relevant to 1, and 2-period ahead operating income growth in 
Denmark, Germany, and Italy, and 1-period ahead operating income growth in Finland, 
and Sweden.  
 
The existence of accounting conservatism is arguably the consequence of contracting 
mechanism.  Chapter  4  exploits  the  use  of  dirty  surplus  flows  in  forging  accounting 
conservatism, and this chapter explains the role of dirty surplus flows from a managerial   97 
perspective,  in  contrast  to  the  previous  two  chapters  that  reflect  the  view  of  stock 
investors.   
   
The ‘news related conservatism’, or NRC, is the differential timeliness that dirty surplus 
flows adjust to bad news vice versa good news. The existence of NRC is because that 
higher  litigation  risks  are  associated  with  the  delaying  of  bad  news.  And  the  ‘news 
unrelated conservatism’, or NUC, is defined as the downward bias in earnings. Earnings 
tend to be lower in countries, where they serve primarily a wealth distribution role rather 
than an informational role. 
 
We show that dirty surplus flows are used to reduce the asymmetric timeliness of net 
income and to reduce the downward bias in net income.     
   
This thesis provides empirical evidence on the use of dirty surplus flows from a stock 
investors’ perspective and a managerial perspective. In particular, dirty surplus flows are 
at  times  value  relevant,  though  in  comparison  to  other  accounting  items,  which  are 
included in currently reported income, they are noisier. It seems that contracting is an 
important explanation for the existence of accounting conservatism and clean surplus 
income is less sensitive to news related conservatism.  
   
Of course, this study only presents the evidence from stock market, which is a debated 
benchmark for accounting information. And the valuation models could miss out some 
potentially relevant variables when explaining the use of dirty surplus accounting flows 
information. Nevertheless, stock market is a reasonable benchmark in distinguishing the 
core components of earnings from the transitory components, and in understanding the 
use of dirty surplus flows in forging accounting conservatism.        98 
This study could add evidence on the use of dirty surplus accounting flows in European 
countries.  It  would  therefore  also  be  interesting  for  practitioners,  and  accounting 
standard setters.    99 
Chapter 5  
Samenvatting  
 
Dit  proefschrift  bestudeert  de  rol  van  ‘dirty  surplus’  (ondernemings)resultaat 
bestanddelen  (DS)  bij  de  waardering  van  aandelen  van  ondernemingen  en  bij  het 
afsluiten van contracten tussen partijen die betrokken zijn bij een onderneming.  
 
Een beschouwing van de rol van DS in beide contexten is actueel gelet op de recente 
discussies  tussen  wetenschappers,  praktijkbeoefenaren  en  regelgevers  over  de 
wenselijkheid om jaarrekeningen op stellen conform de ‘clean surplus’ (CS) relatie, en 
ondernemingen bijgevolg een CS resultaat te laten rapporteren.  
 
Ik richt mij in dit proefschrift specifiek op (i) het verband tussen het DS en CS resultaat 
en het aandelenrendement (als indicator van het economisch resultaat), de persistentie 
van het ondernemingsresultaat met DS elementen, en (ii) de rol die DS bestanddelen 
spelen in conservatisme van jaarrekeningen.  
Accounting informatie wordt gebruikt bij het afsluiten van allerlei soorten contracten met 
en binnen een onderneming. Het voorkomen, en omvang, in een jaarrekening van DS 
kan beïnvloed worden door het gebruik van bewegingsruimte bij het opstellen van een 
jaarreking door het management van een onderneming, gericht op persoonlijke belangen. 
DS informatie kan aan de andere kant ook informatief zijn met betrekking tot het reële 
economische  resultaat.  Inderdaad,  de  drie  belangrijke  DS  bestandsdelen: 
koers(omrekenings)verschillen, afschrijving van goodwill, en herwaardering van activa, 
zijn nauw gerelateerd aan macro-economische factoren, mogelijkheden tot groei, en de 
werkelijke waarde van activa.    100
Kortom,  in  verband  met  DS  elementen  worden  regelgevers  en  praktijkbeoefenaren 
geconfronteerd  met  een  afweging  ten  aanzien  van  het  terugdringen  van  DS  in 
jaarrekeningen, tussen enerzijds relevantie en aan de andere kant betrouwbaarheid van 
DS items. 
Ook zou het terugdringen van het gebruik van DS accounting informatie kunnen leiden 
tot hogere kosten voor betrokkenen, omdat de jaarreking dan moet worden opgesteld 
onder meer strikte vereisten. Aan de andere kant, bij niet terugdringing van het gebruik 
van DS; het is gecompliceerd om DS accounting informatie te verifiëren, hetgeen hogere 
risico's voor betrokkenen met zich kan meebrengen. 
Empirisch materiaal over het gebruik en de rol van DS zou dus duidelijk meer inzicht 
kunnen opleveren omtrent baten en lasten van het niet voldoen aan de CS relatie in 
jaarrekeningen.  Uitgaande  van  een  efficiënte  kapitaalmarkt  zouden  investeerders  het 
gebruk van DS accounting informatie moeten kunnen doorgronden. Het rendement op 
een aandeel refelecteert dan alle relevante financiële verantwoordingsinformatie ongeacht 
de vorm, CS of niet, waarin het gepresenteerd wordt. Het gebruik van het rendement op 
aandelen als benchmark in dit proefschrift stelt mij derhalve in staat om meer zicht te 
krijgen  op  het  gebruik  van  jaarrekeningen  met  DS  elementen  door  investeerders  ten 
behoeve van waardering en voorspelling.  
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik het verband tussen DS en het onderliggend economische 
resultaat  van  ondernemingen  door  middel  van  een  studie  gericht  op  de Nederlandse 
aandelenmarkt. Door het toestaan van een aanzienlijk aantal DS items in de jaarrekening 
van ondernemingen in de periode tussen 1988 en 1997 vormt Nederland een interessante 
omgeving  om  het  bovenstaande  verband  te  onderzoeken  in  die  periode.  Vijf  DS 
bestandsdelen,  afschrijvingen  op  goodwill,  herwaardering  van  activa,  koersverschillen,   101
diversen,  en  buitengewone  DS  elementen,  werden  met  de  hand  verzameld  voor 
Nederlandse beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in de genoemde periode.  
Ik  vergelijk  de  waarde-relevantie  voor  aandelen  van  twee  resultaatmaatstaven:  ‘clean 
surplus’ (CS) resultaat, d.i.. het gerapporteerd resultaat dat werd geschoond voor DS 
elementen, en het gerapporteerde resultaat (met DS bestanddelen). Ik onderzoek ook de 
incrementele waarde relevantie van drie belangrijke bestanddelen van DS: afschrijvingen 
op  goodwill,  activa  herwaardering  en  koersverschillen.  Dit  alles  doe  ik  voor 
tijdsintervallen van verschillende lengte, van 1 to 10 jaar. 
Ik constateer dat zowel het gerapporteerde resultaat als het CS resultaat waarde-relevant 
zijn  Ik  constateer  ook  dat  het  gerapporteerde  resultaat,  met  DS  elementen,  een 
relevantere  maatstaf  van  de  bedrijfsprestaties  lijkt  te  zijn.  Daarnaast  zijn  de  DS 
bestanddelen  herwaardering  van  activa  herwaardering  en  wisselkoersverschillen  voor 
verschillende tijdsperiodes relevant in het incrementeel verklaren van rendementen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 breidt de bovengenoemde analyse uit tot 14 EU landen. De resultaten van 
de empirische analyses (1993-2002) laten zien dat de som van DS bestanddelen van het 
gerapporteerde  resultaat  in  het  algemeen  negatief  is  en  ook  economisch  significant. 
Consistent  met  de  bevindingen  uit  de  Nederlandse  setting  (in  hoofdstuk  2)  is  het 
gerapporteerde resultaat, met DS bestanddelen, de meer waarde-relevante maatstaf van 
bedrijfsprestaties, vergeleken met het CS resultaat.  
Teneinde  ook  de  relevantie  van  DS  accounting  informatie  voor  toekomstige 
ondernemingsprestaties  te  evalueren,  wordt  in  dit  hoofdstuk  naast  het  conventionele 
rendement - resultaat model, tevens een resultaat-voorspellingmodel gebruikt. Dit laatste 
type model richt zich op de relevantie, de persistentie, en de voorspelbaarheid van DS. In 
grote trekken bevestigen de resultaten van deze analyse de eerder genoemde resultaten.   102
Het is aannemelijk dat conservatisme in de jaarrekening samenhangt met de noodzaak tot 
het  afsluiten  van  contracten  tussen  partijen  die  samen  een  onderneming  vormen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 onderzoekt de rol die DS speelt met betrekking tot conservatisme in een 
jaarrekening. In dit hoofdstuk onderzoek ik het voorkomen van DS bestanddelen in een 
jaarrekening  bijgevolg  een  management  perspectief.  In  de  vorige  twee  hoofdstukken 
werd DS onderzocht vanuit het perspectief van beleggers (in aandelen). 
In  de  literatuur  worden  tegenwoordig  een  onderscheid  gemaakt  tussen  twee  soorten 
conservatisme (in een jaarrekening). ‘Nieuws-gerelateerde conservatisme’ (conditioneel) 
(NRC) heeft betrekking op verschillen in snelheid waarmee het ondernemingsresultaat in 
een  jaarrekening  slecht  nieuws  versus  goed  nieuws  m.b.t  tot  een  onderneming 
incorporeert.  ‘Nieuws-ongerelateerde  conservatisme’  (NUC;  in  hoofdstuk  4)  heeft 
betrekking op het on-conditioneel neerwaarts bijstellen van het ondernemingsresultaat.  
Ik toon in hoofdstuk 4 aan (ook in 14 EU landen in de periode 1993-2002) dat NRC en 
NUC  typisch  lager  zijn  in  het  op  CS  basis  bepaalde  resultaat,  vergeleken  met  het 
gerapporteerde resultaat. Ook is NRC meer gelijk tussen de 14 landen in het op CS basis 
bepaalde resultaat. Dit duidt er op dat contract gerelateerde motieven een rol spelen bij 
het aanwezig zijn van DS bestanddelen in het gerapporteerde resultaat. 
Dit  proefschrift  verschaft  empirisch  materiaal  over  het  gebruik  van  DS  vanuit  het 
perspectief van zowel beleggers als managers. DS blijkt op bepaalde momenten waarde-
relevant,  hoewel  deze  bestanddelen  ervan  doorgaans,  in  vergelijking  met  andere 
componenten die deel uitmaken van het gerapporteerde resultaat, meer ruis bevatten.  
Het lijkt verder dat, af te lezen aan het effect van DS bestanddelen op conservatisme, het 
afsluiten van contracten door partijen met en binnen de onderneming inderdaad een 
verklaring is voor het voorkomen van conservatisme in een jaarrekening.   103
Dit onderzoek gebruikt aandelenmarktgegevens als benchmark. Natuurlijk is er discussie 
over de vraag of zo een goede benchmark wordt bekomen. Daarnaast zijn de gebruikte 
waarderingsmodellen  impliciet  onderliggend  aan  de  geschatte  relaties  mogelijk  voor 
kritiek vatbaar.  
Niettemin,  en  dat  was  mijn  doel,  vormt  de  aandelenmarkt  een  alleszins  redelijke 
benchmark  met  het  oog  op  het  beter  begrijpen  van  een  onderscheid  tussen  de 
kernbestanddelen  van  winst  en  de  mogelijk  meer  tijdelijke  bestanddelen  zoals  DS. 
Daarnaast poogde ik in dit proefschrift eveneens te verhelderen, welke rol DS speelt in 
conservatisme in de jaarrekening en de achterliggende motieven daarvoor. 
 
 